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The Rising Impact of the “One Belt One Road Initiative” on China-EU Relations 
Abstract 
Currently the global situation is grim and complex, and most States are facing 
development problems. In response to this situation, Xi Jinping’s Chinese government 
officially announced the B&R Initiative in 2013. Rising influence of the B&R for international 
economic development is an increasing concern for countries along the route, as well within the 
European region. The purpose of the present research study is to explore what promotion can be 
made in order to achieve mutually beneficial results for China-EU cooperation under the B&R? 
By conducting an in-depth analysis, namely to studies on relevant EU policies, documents, 
statements, news reports, and China’s own policy papers on the EU, one gets a comprehensive 
understanding of the development of the recent history of China-EU relations. By analysing the 
existing problems in China-EU relations and the respective influential factors, we can help both 
sides formulate more accurate policies and adjust their strategic positioning. As stated in our, 
there are several countries in a political situation of unrest along the route, therefore, there are 
geopolitical and investment risks faced by China-EU cooperation that need to be seriously 
considered by both sides. For China, to keep improving its level of economic reforms, 
optimizing the environment for foreign investment, regulating unfair competition, improving 
the related implementation mechanisms, laws, and regulations, in order to provide a reliable 
institutional guarantee for EU corporations to invest in China and to attach importance to 
cooperation with important stakeholders has become an inevitable choice. EU member states 
have diverse requirements for national development, therefore it is difficult to speak in a single 
voice towards the B&R. Moreover, both sides lack relevant, qualified expert professionals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the President of China, Mr Xi Jin Ping proposed to build a “Silk Road 
Economic Belt” and the “Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road”, i. e., “The Belt 
and Road Initiative” (The B&R Initiative), also known as the “One Belt One Road”, 
shortly, the “BRI” or “OBOR” (Fig.1). This proposal is reminiscent of “the United 
States proposed New Silk Road Initiative in 2011, a metaphor which is hardly new, 
with China being the owner of the Silk Road terminology” (Pantucci & Lain, 2017). 
The B&R Initiative is a national top-level strategy proposed by China to face the 
current international situation. It relates to Chinese interests, but also involves the 
common interests of the states in the area and even other regions of the world (H.E., 
2017). 
 
Fig.1: China’s proposed Belt and Road Initiative 
 
(Source: http://conceptnewscentral.com/index.php/2017/09/11/major-partner-belt-road-initiative)  
The B&R advocates peaceful development, by actively developing economic 
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partnerships with other states along the proposed route. It aims to build a community 
of common interests, a future, and responsibilities in the fields of political trust, 
economic integration, and cultural inclusiveness. The BRI is an open proposal from 
China to Europe - and to all its partners in the world - to forge a platform for 
diversified cooperation, to integrate China’s development strategies with the 
development strategies of other countries, to generate synergies between government 
policies, and, ultimately, to reduce the risk of the “Thucydides Trap” (war between 
states due to power competition). The B&R aims at improving connectivity between 
Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa in five main areas: policy coordination, 
infrastructure construction, trade facilitation, financial integration, and 
people-to-people exchanges (Amighini, 2017, p. 8-9). States along the B&R route 
have different resources - which constitute economic complementarity – and thus 
there is great potential for mutual cooperation. 
Not only has the B&R included the contents of regional economic cooperation, 
but it has also expanded the scope for cultural cooperation. Economic and cultural 
cooperation are two of the crucial pillars of the B&R. Economic cooperation is the 
hardware support of the B&R, and its contents cover three main aspects: first, to 
maintain free trade; second, to strengthen facilities connectivity; and third, to promote 
currency circulation. Cultural cooperation is the software support of the B&R, 
manifested through two main aspects: to strengthen communications policy, and to 
strengthen communication among the people of the states along the route. 
Capital is an important guarantee for implementing this initiative. Thus, in order 
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to facilitate the implementation of the B&R, China has established the Silk Road 
Fund under the concepts of openness, inclusiveness and mutual benefit, aimed at 
providing financing support for economic and trade cooperation and connectivity 
under the framework of the B&R; and also to cooperate with domestic and overseas 
enterprises as well as with financial institutions for promoting common development 
and prosperity, both for China and for the countries and regions involved in the B&R 
Initiative. Besides, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) by China arouse vigilance by some states, such as the United States. The US 
believes that the operation of AIIB by China may fall outside the jurisdiction of the 
World Bank. Washington excluded itself from the initiative and appears to have 
encouraged partners and allies to do the same. However, some EU member states - 
such as Germany and France - have already joined the AIIB (Strategic Comments, 
2015). These EU member states joined the AIIB, not only to pursue economic 
interests, but also to exert their influence on the “Belt and Road” strategy, in order to 
prepare for any possible changes in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The B&R links China in the east, to Europe in the west. Historically, China and 
Europe have always felt attracted to each other. The ancient Silk Road was originally 
a product of mutual attraction between China and Europe. This attraction has been 
extremely powerful, so much so that people can overcome numerous difficulties and 
dangers, and travel over land and sea, to meet and trade with each other (Zhou, 2017). 
The power of the ancient Silk Road has always been a two-way partnership, rather 
than one-way. Although partnerships between the East and West have ebbed and 
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flowed during different stages in history, the Silk Road has always linked China and 
Europe since ancient times.  
In the twenty-first Century, peace and development have become the world 
theme, but the international situation is quite complex and changeable. With the rapid 
expansion of economic globalization and frequent cultural exchanges, international 
competition has become increasingly fierce. China and the EU have both put forward 
their own strategic development plans - China’s two centenary goals and 12th Five 
Year Plan, and the EU 2020 Strategy - which include various possibilities for 
enhancing cooperation for mutual beneficial results. The two sides committed to 
promote the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the next decade 
(China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 2013). 
 
Research Problem 
Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed a concept of global governance 
under the principles of wide consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. The 
suggestion is for building a community of shared future for mankind. Promoting the 
development of various states and regions is a fundamental way for solving many of 
the existing problems. China’s latest top-level design - the B&R - will have a 
continuous impact on EU member states in the long term. Ever since the B&R was 
launched in 2013, its influence has grown and spread from region to region. However, 
EU’s response to the B&R Initiative is still not clear, and there are several doubts and 
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criticisms, although several projects under the B&R framework are already going on 
in many industries in various EU member states, and although many EU member 
states are actively seeking cooperation with the B&R, as cooperation under the B&R 
favours the interests of both sides. 
Therefore, in order to achieve mutual beneficial results from China-EU 
cooperation under the B&R, what promotions can be made? 
 
Significance and Purpose of the Theme 
Europe is one of the key regions for the construction of the B&R. How to 
promote China-EU cooperation under the framework of this initiative has great 
significance to China-EU cooperation and to deepen bilateral relations. The 
implementation of this initiative will have a significant impact on the development of 
China-EU relations, and will provide new opportunities for the development of 
mutual relations. Both China and the European Union are advocates of 
multilateralism, and are important ambassadors of world peace. The promotion of 
future bilateral relations will be conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in 
human society. It is significant for the “Belt and Road Initiative” to be implemented 
smoothly, so as to seize the opportunity to deepen bilateral relations. (Hou, 2015, p. 
2). 
The Eurasia interconnection transportation infrastructure serves as the basis for 
the Silk Road Economic Belt. Ranging from the east junction of the East Asian 
 6 
economic circle, it goes through Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and extends over 
more than 7,000 kilometres across 18 countries, with more than 40 countries within 
the inner radius, eventually arriving at the Western economic circle. 
In 2013, in the context of the European debt crisis, European Commission 
President Juncker proposed a strategic investment plan named the “Juncker plan”. It 
aimed at promoting investments in infrastructure, information technology, and new 
energy technology that are congruent with the goal of the B&R, which is to promote 
international capacity cooperation. Additionally, since 2012, China has sought 
cooperation on all possible projects with participating Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) states through the ‘16+1 framework’, with the Annual 16+1 Summits being 
backed up by a new fund. The aim of the ‘16+1 cooperation1 framework’ - launched 
in Warsaw in 2012, as a platform for regional cooperation between China and CEE 
states - is to also strengthen the bilateral ties of cooperation between China and 
Europe. By the end of 2017, this framework had already reached various 
achievements in the fields of politics, trade, investment, finance, and infrastructure 
(Liu, 2017). If the B&R manages to promote the mechanism above, it will build a 
more comprehensive strategic partnership between China and the EU. 
This dissertation also dwells on the process by which the B&R has been 
gradually accepted by the various EU member states, from initial doubts and criticism 
                                               
1 The ‘16+1 Framework’ is an initiative by the People’s Republic of China aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 
11 EU Member States plus 5 Balkan countries, namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. Moreover, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Poland, Romania are EU member states.  
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to acceptance, and to the active participation of some member states. This study will 
analyse the different interpretations and attitudes towards the B&R, both from China 
and the EU; especially the EU’s initial doubts and criticisms on the B&R - as far as 
the participation of some members - until the active participation of some EU main 
member states, and how from the EU’s opinion on the B&R have emerged positive 
voices. 
Assuming Social Constructivism as the theoretical framework, the initial 
hypothesis of the present dissertation is: how will the B&R Initiative influence 
China-EU relations. Can the B&R Initiative contribute to the development of 
China-EU relations, and move forward the interests of both actors? 
In International Relations theory, Realism and Liberalism developed out of the 
anarchy hypothesis. Social Constructivism emerged after the Cold War. In the article 
“Anarchy is what States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics, ” 
Alexander Wendt argued “that self-help and power politics do not follow either 
logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help 
world, this is due to process, not structure. There is no ‘logic’ of anarchy apart from 
the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather 
than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. 
Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features, of anarchy” 
(Wendt, 1992, p. 391). What Wendt means is that the structures of human association 
are determined primarily by shared ideas, rather than by material forces, thus, anarchy 
is not inherent in the international system, as classical International Relations theories 
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envisioned. It is rather a construct of nation-states within the system. The idea of state 
is enabled by the ongoing processes of social practice and interaction, rather than 
inherent (Wendt, 1999). Actors are not simply governed by the imperatives of a 
self-help system; their identities and interests drive their action. When it comes to the 
state, interests and identities are central determinants of state behaviour. Finnemore 
and Wendt emphasize that, while ideas and processes tend to explain the social 
construction of identities and interests, those ideas and processes form a structure of 
their own, which impacts upon international actors (Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1998). 
The identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by those shared ideas, 
rather than given by nature (Wendt, 1999). 
Methodologically, Constructivism first emphasizes the role of society in regards 
to the individual. At international society level, it accounts for the role of the 
international structure in regards to the state. From an ontological viewpoint, Wendt 
denies pure materialism and advocates attaching importance to the role of ideas. He 
stresses the significance of system culture (or shared knowledge, shared concepts, 
etc.). He recognizes the objective existence of material factors, but emphasizes that 
objective factors can only influence the meaning of behaviour through the common 
concept of actors. The social structure of international politics not only affects the 
behaviour of actors, but also constructs the identity and interests of the actors 
themselves.  
Secondly, it adopts the principle of anti-materialism, that is, the basic structure of 
international politics is not only the material construction, but also the social construct. 
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This principle does not deny the objective existence of matter, but opposes the view 
of pure materialism and intuitionistic materialism: that the objective existence of 
matter is the only and main reason for explaining the behaviour of actors. The 
existence of social categories has a material basis. The state is not only a social 
category, but also an abstract social concept that cannot be observed directly. 
However, the existence of the state is an objective fact. 
Thirdly, the distinction between subject and object in research is not as clear as it 
is in the natural world, but it can still be distinguished. The international system is an 
objective social existence for researchers of International Relations. There is an 
objective basis for social phenomena. Constructivism acknowledges this objective 
basis and regards it as the fundamental basis of Constructivist methodology. In 
Constructivism, the unit is the state, the main actor of international relations (Wendt, 
1999). 
Wendt considered the role of the cultural structure of the international system in 
building national identity and interests. Thus, Constructivism explores ontology, and 
focuses on the construction process between structure and actors. That means, the 
international structure constructs the identity and interests of actors, and actors can only 
take actions commensurate with their identity and interests.  
There are three main elements in Constructivism. The first and most fundamental 
element is common knowledge or culture. Common knowledge refers to the perception 
and expectation shared by actors in a specific social environment. In this environment, 
common knowledge constructs the identity and interests of actors. For instance, the 
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security dilemma is such a shared knowledge or structure: when expectations and 
perceptions among actors are suspicious, there will always be the worst estimation of 
motives and intentions of the others. Thus, when one side increases its armament, the 
other side will inevitably feel threatened, resulting in a security dilemma (Baylis, 2017). 
The second is the role of material factors. The structure contains material factors, such 
as the power of a state. However, the significance of material factors is very limited: 
only when its exists in the social structure, will it virtually impact the behaviour of 
actors. Third, as regards conditions for the existence of social structures, Wendt 
believes that the formation and existence of social structure itself is the result of the 
social practices of actors: the interaction between actors forms social construction. This 
argument emphasizes its process, and also includes the possibility of variability in the 
social structure. In Constructivism, the structure is dynamic: actors can construct a 
structure or decompose it, and build another structure, formed by different ideals. For 
instance, states can construct a security dilemma or a security community. Once the 
actor’s ideals change, its actions can change, as well as the structure of the international 
system (Wendt, 1999). 
Constructivism emphasizes the interactions between the actor and the structure. 
This involves two important relations in constructivism. The first is the role of the actor 
to the structure; the second is the role of the structure to the actor. The interaction of 
actors forms the structure, which, in turn, constructs the identity and interests of the 
actors. For instance, if two countries never interacted, they have no common 
knowledge and, therefore, no structure. Once the interaction begins, the initial 
 11 
behaviour will make the two sides in the interaction produce and strengthen certain 
concepts through reciprocal mechanisms and may begin to share these concepts, thus 
forming a culture.  
Constructivism is relevant to this dissertation, as it may explain the factors that 
influence China-EU relations. If the relationship with the EU improve, will depend on 
the sequence of the interaction between China and the EU. Assuming Social 
Constructivism as the theoretical Framework, and that China and the EU are major 
proponents of multilateralism, the initial hypothesis of the present dissertation is that 
the B&R Initiative may move forward the interests of both China and EU. 
On the side of China, the 19th Chinese People’s Congress has established President 
Xi’s leadership by amending the Constitution, which effectively guarantees the 
sustainable implementation of the B&R (Jiang, 2018). On the EU side, from initial 
doubts, to the responses of some member states, up to the cooperation of multiple 
projects under the framework of the B&R conducted in the EU region. Although the 
attitude of governments, the Media and public opinion is still unclear in some EU 
member states, in fact, there is no lack of enthusiasm and confidence in the cooperation 
with China under the B&R framework in EU society (Putten et al., 2016). The action 
taken by theses member states, as Robert Keohane argued that the functions of 
international regimes is based on the assumption that governments behave as rational 
egoists (Keohane, 2005). In order to revitalize their economies, the EU member states 
involved in the B&R - due to their different levels of development - have different 
requirements, therefore, it is difficult to form a unified response internally from the EU. 
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Thus, considering the existing historical contexts on the development of this process, 
each transformation is catalysed by various influencing factors. No matter how positive 
China’s propaganda on the B&R might be, or how negative international public 
opinion might be, the actual present achievements are the persuasive evidence to assert 
the B&R since it was proposed in 2013 (China Government, 2017).  
The B&R initiated by China has been inspired by China’s own economic 
development. It emphasises investment on infrastructure development, in order to 
promote trade. It is an open initiative - open to all countries - in which the 
implementation of detailed plans and regulations are processed through constant 
practice, exploring and developing. All participating countries decide on the direction 
for future development and policy formulation. 
To define the nature of the B&R, according Robert Keohane, who defined 
multilateralism as “the practice of coordinating national policies within groups of three 
or more states” in 1990, even considering the AIIB - a multilateral development bank - 
as one of its financial components, the B&R cannot however be considered as a 
multilateralism mechanism. As argued by Grzegorz Stec “China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative is neither a strategy, nor a vision, it is a process” (Stec, 2018). 
There are several reasons why the EU and most member states refused to sign the 
B&R cooperation agreement, the first of which is the fact that the concept of the B&R 
is too broad, unable to be specific about what it supports. 
In addition, at least 11 EU member states within the China-led “16+1 framework” 
have raised concerns that the Beijing initiative is aimed at splitting the EU. 
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Secondly, the United States have questioned the B&R, which has also put off some 
main EU member states, such as France and Germany. Still, most of the countries in the 
world welcome the opportunities presented by the B&R (Pantucci and Lain, 2016). 
Within EU academic circles, there are various pragmatic perspectives that focus on and 
criticize the conflicts of interests between China and the EU in the B&R. Regarding 
such criticisms, as we have been able to observe that there is a contradiction between 
the political negative attitude and the commercial positive, cooperative attitude, this 
means that, in fact, there are some aspects that are in the interest of the EU. 
The next step of the B&R is multilateralization, with Chinese characteristics. This 
means that such a multilateral framework retains Chinese characteristics, allowing 
China to keep ultimate control over key projects, while at the same time engaging with 
other developed countries, especially European countries and South Korea. “In other 
words, China is willing to make compromises and to share benefits with other countries, 
but it ultimately strives to preserve the BRI’s non-Western model” (Herrero and Xu, 
2019). Accordingly, given that the B&R is not yet a mature framework, the 
involvement of the EU in policy-making during the B&R development process is 
crucial for the EU.  
As stated above in the research objectives, this dissertation focuses on the impact 
of the B&R upon China-EU relations. Thus, it requires deep inquiry on both the official 
and unofficial interactions between China and the EU since the B&R Initiative was 
launched in 2013, as well as understanding the responses and actions from both sides. 
This dissertation aims at providing a comprehensive interpretation of the building 
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of the B&R, namely by demonstrating that it is a new opportunity and platform to 
enhance China-EU relations, and for discovering areas of common interest. This 
dissertation also highlights existing internal issues between China and the EU, as well 
as the influence of other major powers in the world, while also trying to provide related 
information for enhancing cooperation between China and EU member states, which 
may have a practical impact. 
The B&R is conducive to promoting the healthy development of China-EU 
relations. China is playing a more and more significant role in the world stage. The 
European Union is the largest regional international organization, with the highest level 
of integration in the world. Thus, in a sense, cooperation between China and the EU is 
highly complementary.  
The “Belt and Road Initiative” conforms to the long-term interests of both China 
and the EU. It will help expand cooperation between China and the EU in a number of 
fields and raise bilateral relations to a higher level. For China, it will be beneficial for 
solving its growing dependence on imported energy and maritime commercial lanes 
(Wang, 2016). For the EU, the European Commission and China have concluded their 
technical work, allowing Beijing to start pouring up to €10 billion under the so-called 
Juncker Plan (Valero, 2017). Infrastructure construction is one of the key fields of the 
“Juncker plan”. Therefore, it is in accordance with China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. 
Both sides have made a very important breakthrough in the “Belt and Road Initiative”. 
The Chinese New Silk Road can become a way out for the EU, which has been 
suffering from a protracted economic slowdown, and may strengthen Eurasian 
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continental powers, both politically and economically (“Sputniknews”, 2015). 
It will also contribute to the maintenance of world peace and stability. The EU is 
one of the most developed economic areas in the world, and has been an important trade 
partner of China for several years. In recent years, the comprehensive strength and 
influence of China has been rising continuously, increasingly making China one of the 
most important international forces, and its development has attracted the attention of 
the rest of the world. China and the European Union are two important forces to foster 
the development of world multipolarization, as well as to maintain world peace and 
stability (Cao, 2017, p24). This B&R Initiative will not only promote the development 
of China-EU relations, but will also promote world prosperity and stability for the 
states along the route. 
 
Relevance and Contribution of this Research Study 
China and the EU have established diplomatic relations for more than 40 years. 
The development of China-EU relations has evolved from a “partnership” in 1998, to 
a “comprehensive partnership” in 2001, and then to a “comprehensive strategic 
partnership” in 2003. This evolution has established “peace, growth, reform, and 
civilization” as the main content of the “comprehensive strategic partnership.” 
Therefore, the stability of China-EU relations is becoming increasingly clear. With the 
launch of the B&R Initiative, China-EU relations are facing new development 
opportunities. 
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Europe is still in a debt crisis, and, moreover, China is going through a crucial 
period of restructuring its economy. If both sides want to engage in overall planning, 
and in developing bilateral relations in the direction of mutual benefit and win-win 
results, they should not lack any preventive measures for existing and anticipated 
problems (Wu & Jensen, 2017). Throughout history, China and Europe have always 
needed each other. I personally believe that China and the EU need to develop a 
mutual cultural identity. In particular, there is a need to improve the inherent 
understanding of Europe and to break the ideological opposition between China and 
Europe, in order to accomplish, not only an economically significant relationship, but 
also the spiritual civilization that the B&R will help achieve. 
 
Scope of the Dissertation 
Initially, this thesis will briefly review the China-EU interaction after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. It will focus on the period from 2013 onwards - 
when the initiative was proposed - and on the main interactions and transformations in 
China-EU relations that have developed since then, such as the fact that several EU 
member states have joined the AIIB, despite countervailing pressures from the US for 
the EU not to join; China’s accession to the EBRD (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development), which forged synergies between the B&R and the 
EU Juncker plan; the “16+1 framework” mechanism between China and Central and 
Eastern Europe; the joint development of complementary industries with other EU 
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member states; as well as on the cultural exchanges between China and Europe. 
Chapter 2 elaborates on how the B&R Initiative has been proposed, some major 
achievements and its significance. Chapter 3 scans the role of the EU in the B&R, and 
focuses on the interaction between China and the EU since the B&R has been 
proposed. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth analysis of the existing risks and obstacles 
for China-EU cooperation in the implementation of the B&R. In the Conclusion I will 
make some suggestions on how to promote China-EU relations, namely related to the 
support from relevant expert professionals; to the requirements on China’s side 
regarding relevant institutions and legislation; to various requirements internal to the 
EU; and to the political risks along the route in several states. 
 
From the Literature Review 
Currently, the global situation is grim and complex. China and the EU are two of 
the most important economies in the world, and they are the two main markets for 
promoting common economic development in the world. Both of them are going 
through a critical stage of reforms and development (Hooijmaaijers, 2017). The “Belt 
and Road Initiative” makes both sides stand on a new starting point with increasing 
potential for development. Development is the main direction of the “Belt and Road 
Initiative”. It is not only an important measure for deep reforms and opening-up 
China, it also represents the exploring of a new mode of international cooperation by 
China. The Chinese government is actively seeking cooperation with the EU (H.E., 
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2017). China’s joining the EBRD is conducive to more investment opportunities by 
Chinese enterprises. Not only does it contribute towards the “Belt and Road 
Initiative”, but it also opens up increased financing channels for cooperation in 
Europe (Xinhuanet, 2015). Ultimately, for the “Belt and Road Initiative”, Europe is 
not merely an important target market for the “Belt and Road” construction, the 
reactions and attitudes of the EU will also affect the “Belt and Road Initiative” within 
international public opinion. Can China cooperate with the EU in third markets 
through the “Belt and Road Initiative”? Namely in projects in Africa, for instance? All 
of these will deeply influence the success and overall dimensional expansion of the 
“Belt and Road Initiative”. 
With the passing of time, the EU has obviously changed its response to the “Belt 
and Road Initiative”. Since the announcement of the “B&R”, until 2014, EU member 
states had remained quite apathetic about it. From 2014 to early 2015, with the “16+1” 
cooperation mechanism, European States began to offer a positive response to the 
“Belt and Road Initiative”. After 2015, the “Belt and Road Initiative” began to receive 
more comprehensive prominent responses within Europe. After better comprehending 
the “Belt and Road Initiative”, European States began to show a stronger willingness 
to cooperate with China. In fact, in 2014, China’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
Europe amounted to 10.84 billion dollars; the year-on-year growth rate was as high as 
82.2%. Among China’s FDI in Europe, the investment within the EU accounted for 
90.3%, reaching 7.90 billion dollars. By the end of 2015, China had direct 
investments with 2,300 enterprises in the EU, and it had covered all 28 member states 
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of the European Union, hiring nearly 90 thousand foreign employees. Economic 
interactions were complemented by numerous official dialogues, covering a wide 
range of issues. The year of 2013 was the 40th anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between China and the EU. The “EU-China 2020 Strategic 
Agenda for Cooperation” and the perspectives of an agreement on investment offer 
the impression of a highly dynamic partnership, cultivated by both sides (Prodi and 
Gosset, 2013). 
The initiative is bound to become a tremendous economic opportunity, as well as 
a challenge for the European Union: “There is the risk, in fact, that a scramble for 
Chinese money could further divide EU member states and make it difficult for 
Brussels to come up with a common position vis-à-vis Beijing” (Casarini, 2017). 
Holslag argued: “Yet, a closer look at documents, plans and programmes prepared by 
different Chinese government departments reveals that the New Silk Road serves a 
strategy of offensive mercantilism. Offensive mercantilism implies that China is 
shifting from protecting its industries in domestic markets to supporting them in their 
penetration of foreign markets” (Holslag, 2017). He argues that the initiative will 
benefit China’s exports to EU member states and lead to competition between China 
and EU member states, which would reduce EU member states exports. 
The cooperation between China and the EU within the “Belt and Road Initiative” 
has also some existing problems: the complexity of resource allocation and 
coordination in China, the scarcity of specialized professionals with high levels of 
literacy, the complexity of interaction within the EU system, the fallout of the great 
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power struggle, political unrest, and the threats of non-traditional security issues 
(Austermann & Vangeli, 2017). The inherent cognitive differences regarding the B&R 
between China and the EU will particularly affect the expansion of China-EU 
cooperation under the framework of the B&R Initiative. 
 
Methodology 
The main research methods used for this thesis are literature analysis and the 
qualitative method. 
Literature analysis will be conducted by browsing the relevant literature on 
China-EU relations and on the BRI available in the Internet, especially the websites of 
relevant government departments. Namely by analysing studies on relevant EU 
policies, documents, statements, and news reports, and China’s policy papers on the 
EU, in order to get a comprehensive understanding of the development of the history 
of China-EU relations, especially of the development of bilateral relations since the 
EU adjusted its policy towards China. By accessing such materials, my aim is to grasp 
the profound connotation and significance of the B&R Initiative. Literature analysis is 
the most relevant method for writing this dissertation. 
As for the qualitative method, it will help interpret official policy documents by 
assessing the strategic position between the EU and China. By analysing the existing 
issues in China-EU relations and the respective influential factors, it will help both 
sides formulate more accurate policies and adjust their strategic positioning. Also, 
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through the research conducted on the rising impact of the B&R, I will be able to 
demonstrate how valid it is for this initiative to be implemented. 
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1. Implementation and Significance of the Belt and Road Initiative 
The B&R refers to “the 21st Century Silk Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road.” It is an important development strategic initiative put 
forward by the government of China. Based on the experience of China’s own 
economic success, on the changing global situation, on examining the development gap 
between China and the international community, and on China’s overall national and 
international status, it integrates the historical symbolism of the ancient Silk Road with 
the new demands of today’s world. Through the B&R Initiative, China intends to 
inherit and develop the spirit of the ancient Silk Road: peace and cooperation, openness 
and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit. In other words, to build an 
interconnected and interoperable system in the new era of ‘peace, development and 
win-win cooperation’. On the one hand, the B&R will deepen the Chinese ‘opening-up’ 
policy, enabling China to integrate in greater depth the mainstream global economic 
system, while on the other hand, contributing to exploring a new model of international 
cooperation and global governance. 
 
1.1. The Proposal and Development of the Belt and Road 
The B&R stemmed from the ancient Silk Road, which was “an ancient network of 
trade routes connecting the East and West. It contributed to cultural and economic 
interaction between the regions for many centuries. The ancient Silk Road refers to 
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both the terrestrial and the maritime routes connecting East Asia, Southeast Asia, West 
Asia, East Africa, and Southern Europe. The Silk Road derives its name from the 
lucrative trade in silk carried out along its length, beginning in the Han dynasty (207 
BCE–220 CE). The Han dynasty expanded the Central Asian section of the trade routes 
around 114 BCE through the missions and explorations of the Chinese imperial envoy 
Zhang Qian” (Elisseeff, 2001, p. 3). 
The “Maritime Silk Road refers to the maritime section of the historic Silk Road 
connecting China to Southeast Asia, Indonesian archipelago, Indian subcontinent, 
Arabian Peninsula, Somalia and all the way to Egypt, Uganda, and finally Europe, that 
flourished between the 2nd Century BCE and the 15th Century CE” (Iwanek, 2018). The 
ancient Silk Road is a maritime channel for political and economic exchanges between 
ancient China and other empires, which further promoted the ideological and cultural 
exchanges between the East and the West. 
The Chinese economy has experienced astonishing growth in the last few decades, 
that has catapulted the country to become the world’s second largest economy (Focus 
Economics, 2017). Such Chinese economic development has attracted worldwide 
attention. China has become an economic power; however, with the largest population 
in the world, and while still maintaining an unbalanced regional economic development 
internally. 
Since the beginning of the 21st Century, the political and economic situation of the 
world has undergone a series of complex, profound changes, accompanied by the 
complexity of the world’s multi-polarization, economic globalization, and the 
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emergence of the political security crisis. The different countries are facing various 
important challenges, as for instance those of economic development, defence and 
security. 
As a response to the current international situation and to China’s own internal 
issues, General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed the B&R Initiative. It represents not only 
the demand for a new round of reforms and for further opening up of China, but also 
represents a desire to further promote regional cooperation in Asia. It is committed to 
contributing towards world peace and stability, and to improve joint demand through 
long-term development cooperation. (Wu, 2014). 
There are four main aspects of China’s domestic background: 
a. Overcapacity and excessive foreign exchange assets. The IMF estimates 
that China’s total capacity utilization rate is under 65%, therefore China 
desires to expand its overseas market and to participate in the global market 
competition, while the countries lacking infrastructures are precisely in need 
of the high quality-price ratio of Chinese infrastructure construction. 
b. China’s oil, gas and mineral resources are highly dependent on foreign 
imports. 
c. China’s industry and infrastructure are concentrated along the coast, once it 
encounters external aggress in this area, it is easy for it to lose these core 
facilities. China wishes to break the original development pattern of dots 
and blocks by extending in the vertical and horizontal directions, 
emphasising inter-provincial interconnection and strengthening regional 
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coordination. 
d. The overall situation of China’s border region is at its best status ever in 
history, and the willingness of neighbouring countries to strengthen 
cooperation with China is generally increasing, which will help rebalance 
the influence of the United States and Japan on the Eurasian continent (Hua, 
2018, p.3). 
In September 2013, during the visit of General Secretary Xi Jinping to Central 
Asia, he delivered a speech entitled ‘Promoting People-to-People Friendship and 
Creating a Better Future’ at the University of Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan on September 
7th. Mr Xi proposed to build a ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ with Central Asian Countries, 
from just a point to an area, from a line to region, gradually enhancing regional 
cooperation to a certain level (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2013). It was the 
Chinese leader himself that proposed this major strategic concept of building a ‘Silk 
Road Economic Belt’ at an international public forum for the first time. In the following 
month of October, General Secretary Xi Jinping put forward a proposal to jointly build 
the ‘Maritime Silk Road of the Twenty-first Century’ in the speech entitled ‘Building a 
China-ASEAN future community’ at the Indonesian Congress during his visit to the 
Central and South regions of Asia (Xi, 2013). So far, these two initiatives are the first 
known elements of the B&R. In the same year, Chinese Premier of the State Council Li 
Keqiang emphasised building a Maritime Silk Road and forming a strategic fulcrum to 
promote the development of the hinterland with ASEAN member states, when he 
attended the China-ASEAN Exhibition in 2013 (Fan, 2017). 
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On October 24 2014, the finance ministers and authorized representatives of the 
first 21 intending founding members, including China, India, and Singapore, among 
other countries, signed an agreement in Beijing to establish the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, which is something different from the Silk Road Fund.  
On November 8 2014, General Secretary Xi announced that China will invest 40 
billion US dollars to establish the Silk Road Fund at the 2014 Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) dialogue on strengthening interconnections and partnerships. In 
the same year of 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi confirmed that more than 50 
countries along the B&R route had already responded positively in 2013 - the year 
when the B&R had been proposed - and that China is willing to link up with the 
respective development strategy of these countries (Zhai, 2015). 
In the beginning of 2015, the B&R Initiative was gradually incorporated into 
China’s national development strategy, namely into the governmental document 
‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road’ announced on March 28th, which can be regarded as the 
formal launch of the B&R Initiative. In generally, the B&R Initiative then entered the 
stage of co-construction and implementation of cooperation with countries along the 
route. On November 7, General Secretary Xi delivered a speech at the National 
University of Singapore, declaring that China is welcoming the participation and 
cooperation of neighbouring countries. At the annual conference of the ‘BOAO Forum 
for Asia’ in 2015 Mr Xi stated that “In order to promote this initiative, China will 
follow the principles of wide consultation, joint contribution, and shared benefits. The 
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development programs will be open and inclusive, not exclusive. It will be a real chorus 
including all countries along the routes, and not a solo for China itself. Building the 
Belt and Road does not have the purpose of replacing existing mechanisms or 
initiatives for regional cooperation. Much to the contrary, it will build on the existing 
basis to help countries align their development strategies and create complementarities 
(…) The Belt and Road Initiative is not meant as rhetoric. It represents real work that 
can be seen and felt to bring real benefits to countries in the region. Thanks to the 
concerted efforts of all parties, the Vision and Action paper of the initiative has been 
developed. Substantive progress has been made in the establishment of the AIIB. The 
Silk Road Fund has also been launched, and the construction of a number of 
infrastructure connectivity projects are moving forward” (Xi, 2015). 
On October 17 2016, Mr Xi emphasised ‘pursuing joint development and benefits 
on the basis of equality and mutual benefits’ when promoting the symposium on the 
B&R construction work in Beijing. On September 4 2016, Mr Xi delivered a keynote 
speech at the ‘2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit’, where he said that “China’s development 
has benefited from the international community, and we are now ready to provide more 
public goods to the international community. I proposed the initiative of building the 
‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ to share China’s 
development opportunities with countries along the Belt and Road, and to achieve 
common prosperity” (Xi, 2016).  
On January 17 2017, Mr Xi announced that China would hold the ‘Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation’ in Beijing at the annual meeting of the Davos 
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World Economic Forum. On May 14 2017, the ‘Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation’ was held in Beijing. It drew 29 foreign heads of state and government, as 
well as representatives from more than 130 countries and 70 international organizations 
(CGTN, 2017). 
From the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2017, China has actively promoted the 
B&R Initiative at both bilateral and multilateral level. Especially at bilateral level, 
Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping and Chinese Premier of the State Council Li 
Keqiang were frequently visiting other countries. For instance, according to existing 
statistics, from 2013 to 2017, Mr Xi visited 50 regions and international organizations 
(Sina, 2018). 
At domestic level, many provinces referred to the B&R in their local government 
work reports, and have been actively seeking to participate and integrate the B&R 
framework, which became a common attitude at all levels of the country. At 
international level, the attitudes of the various countries regarding the B&R are quite 
diverse. However, the concerns of the international community on the B&R became 
increasingly heated since sections of its implementation have been launched (Ifeng, 
2017). 
The B&R originally based on the ancient Silk Road - but not just limited to the 
ancient Silk Road - inherits and promotes the spirit of the ancient Silk Road, while also 
intending to meet the new contemporary demands of the world. It can be considered as 
the continuation and development of the ancient Silk Road, as can be seen in the B&R 
development process from its very germination to its top design, and then to its 
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implementation, as can be observed in its entire process from a proposal to its 
development. Furthermore, another important aspect is that the B&R is not a strategic 
plan exclusively designed by China. It is constantly changing and developing over time; 
its content is being constantly enriched, its measures are constantly innovating, and its 
method is constantly improving in the interactions with the countries along the route. 
The path for jointly building the B&R framework is based on goal coordination and 
policy communication. “It is not a deliberate pursuit for consistency, it is endowed with 
high flexibility and elasticity, and it will be a diversified and open cooperation process” 
(National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and State Council, 2015). 
 
1.2. The Main Measures and Substances of the Belt and Road 
The ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road’ (‘Vision and Action’), launched in the beginning of 2015, 
presented the strategic plan for the B&R on eight main aspects, such as Background, 
Principles, Framework, etc. The geographical scope of the B&R is described in its 
Framework as follows: “The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together 
China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic), linking China with the Persian 
Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia, and connecting 
China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road has been designed to start from China’s coast to Europe through 
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the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through 
the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other route” (National Development and 
Reform Commission et al., 2015). 
According to the ‘Vision and Action’, it emphasises joint building through 
consultation, in order to meet the interests of all participant countries. To promote a 
new mode of regional economic cooperation, the implementation of the B&R is 
conducted according to the principles of ‘planning together, building together and 
benefiting together.’ These principles - accepted by various countries - are aimed at 
encouraging the countries along the B&R route to participate in the implementation of 
the B&R. “It promotes practical cooperation in all fields, and works towards a 
community of shared interests, future and responsibility, featuring mutual political trust, 
economic integration, and cultural inclusiveness,” which are the cornerstone of 
mutually beneficial and pragmatic cooperation, in order to constantly expand the 
intersection of interests and transform the complementarity of the various economies 
into mutual assistance development. In addition, the huge Chinese consumer market, 
the rapid growth of Chinese demand for energy and other raw materials, the relatively 
high cost-effectiveness of huge commodity supplies to China, as well as the economic, 
investment and financing capabilities of China, are actual development opportunities 
for the countries along the B&R route. It conforms to the development demands of the 
countries along the B&R, especially in regards to developing countries. Therefore, the 
participant countries along the B&R route may gain in terms of development 
opportunities coming from the economic development of China (National 
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Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and State Council, 2015). 
The B&R was designed to foster cooperation in five main areas with Eurasian 
states, namely, the formation of mutually complementary policies, connectivity of road 
systems, trade facilitation, monetary circulation, and strengthened people-to-people 
exchanges. Mainly covering the following three dimensions: 
First, to manage the direction of cooperation. “From the B&R route and the 
countries involved, there are six main lines in the B&R, passing through 68 countries 
and regions in the world. There are two directions of cooperation for the B&R, the 
direction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the direction of the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road, an international shipping channel” (National Development and Reform 
Commission et al., 2015). 
Second, to build a corridor for international economic cooperation. On land, it 
relies on the main international channel, to support the key cities along the B&R route, 
while the most important economic and trade industries constitute the cooperation 
platform. At sea, the important ports act as connections, to build a feasible, safe and 
efficient maritime transport channel. 
The third is to promote the creation of a new pattern for regional economic 
integration, with a wider scope, a wider field, and towards a deeper level. The 
implementation of the B&R aims at achieving greater regional interconnectedness, 
intimate economic ties, mutual political trust, and more extensive and deeper 
people-to-people exchanges (Xinhua net, 2015). 
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This report highlights six main land corridors to be built in the Silk Road 
Economic Belt (see Fig.2):  
Figure. 2: With the Silk Road Initiative, China aims to build a global infrastructure 
network 
 
(Source: MERICS, 2015, 
https://external-preview.redd.it/4je9fwm3KtlSUr3E6LSq_PbfX2G2YwYQcJxqwn1gXLs.jpg?s=effecd
5263370477435a5110b4e716f6f09aa0d5) 
a. The New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor: a network of connections 
between Chinese and European cities, passing through Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Belarus and Poland. 
b. The China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor: an agreement to increase 
trilateral cooperation, combining the SREB, Russia’s part of the Eurasia Land 
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Bridge and Mongolia’s Steppe Road project. 
c. The China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor: a commitment 
towards building infrastructure and cooperating on trade, investment, finance, 
transports and communications with the five Central Asian states, as well as 
Turkey and Iran (West Asia). 
d. The China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor: a commitment towards 
greater infrastructure cooperation between China and the five Indochina 
Peninsula countries, namely Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, and 
Myanmar. 
e. The BCIM Economic Corridor: aimed at improving connectedness between 
Kunming and Mandalay, Dakha and Kolkata. 
f. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor: aims to offer an alternative solution 
for the connection between China and the wider world, mainly focused on the 
infrastructure field. It includes the projects in Gwadar port and city, roadway 
projects, railway projects, and energy sector projects. The CPEC is intended to 
rapidly modernize Pakistani infrastructure and strengthen its economy through 
the construction of modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects, 
and special economic zones, while also fostering economic development in the 
western region of China（Raffaello Pantucci & Sarah Lain, 2017, p. 10-11). 
On the whole, by analysing the content of the B&R, a major feature is the B&R 
emphasis on developing and taking advantage of economic benefits. It includes the 
construction of infrastructures, a free trade area, transnational economic cooperation, 
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an economic corridor, financial investment, and many other areas. Another feature is 
that development is the main guideline. 
Actually, the B&R Initiative also covers the content of regional economic 
cooperation, namely to expand the scope of humanistic cooperation. In other words, 
economic cooperation and humanistic cooperation appear at the two main pillars of the 
B&R Initiative, and this is precisely the main content of this initiative. 
Economic cooperation is seen as the hardware support for the B&R, which 
includes three sections: 
The first, is to promote free trade. The key to promoting free trade is to increase 
the level of facilitation of trade and investment. To that end, the existing trade barriers 
between the countries along the route have to be removed, in order to create an open 
trade environment. Bilateral or multilateral free trade zones must also be established 
among the countries along the route, to broaden the areas of mutual cooperation and to 
expand the scale and scope of trade and investment; and also to promote the amending 
of the trade structure, and to explore new trade growth points, while consolidating and 
expanding traditional trade areas, and focusing on promoting the development of 
services for modern trade. 
The second, is to improve connectivity facilities. The connections between the 
countries along the route need to be strengthened, including roads, railways, and other 
transport facilities. While the connection of energy and communication infrastructures 
also need to be strengthened, including pipelines for oil and gas, communication 
networks, and other infrastructures. 
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The third, is to enhance financial integration, namely by promoting exchange and 
settlements in local currencies in order to reduce transaction costs; by promoting 
efficient financial settlements; by promoting and deepening trade and investment 
among countries along the route, and consequentially by enhancing the international 
competitiveness of the regional economies. 
Humanistic cooperation is seen as the software support for the B&R, and its 
content is manifested in two main aspects: 
The first is to strength policy coordination. Although the B&R Initiative was 
proposed by China, the implementation of the B&R is not unilaterally led by China. It 
will reflect the interests of each country along the route, and has to be negotiated and 
jointly built by the countries along the route (Yuan, 2014). Due to the fact that the 
various countries involved have different resource endowments and levels of economic 
development, in order to find a common ground and to maximize the effective 
connection between the B&R Initiative and each country’s strategies, these countries 
need to strengthen communications and exchanges in economic development strategies 
and policies, as well as to develop practical and feasible cooperation strategies, and the 
specific measures of implementation through negotiations between participant 
countries, thus eventually contributing to the promotion of pragmatic cooperation. 
The second is to enhance people-to-people bonds. To promote the spirit of friendly 
cooperation of the ancient Silk Road, and to increase mutual communication and 
perception among people in the various countries along the route. To this end, 
educational and cultural exchanges will be launched, harmonious coexistence among 
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people of participant countries will be fostered, and the foundation of public opinion for 
regional cooperation will be consolidated. 
 
1.3. The Financial Component of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ 
On the November 8 2014, President Xi proposed that China will invest 40 billion 
US dollars to establish the Silk Road Fund. On December 29th of the same year, the Silk 
Road Fund officially began to operate. The Silk Road Fund - with investment from the 
China State Administration of Foreign Exchange, China Investment Corporation, 
Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank - will directly contribute 
towards the B&R, to promote infrastructure connectedness under the B&R framework 
(Xinhua, 2015). The Silk Road Fund is a special fund to serve the B&R Initiative. It 
was initially established to support and promote the implementation and promotion of 
the B&R. It is in line with the development strategy of various countries, and its aims 
are to provide financial support for the construction of infrastructure and other fields 
under the B&R framework; to promote the development of participant countries in 
various fields such as transportation, energy, and communications; as well as to 
contribute towards promoting regional economic integration and the sustainable 
development of the world economy (Silk Road Fund, 2014). 
In January 2016, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) began to 
operate. The AIIB, headquartered in Beijing, is a multilateral development bank with 
the mission of improving social and economic outcomes in Asia. Until the end of 2017, 
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the AIIB had grown to 87 approved members worldwide. Mainly focused on investing 
in areas such as sustainable infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia and 
beyond, with the aim of creating better connections between peoples, services and 
markets (AIIB, 2016). 
The AIIB was not specifically designed for the B&R, but both actually 
complement each other. The implementation of the B&R is based on the construction of 
interconnection infrastructures, moreover, the AIIB operates according to a multilateral 
development bank model and structure, primarily providing loans to invest in Asian 
infrastructure. In addition, most of the countries along the route are developing 
countries, requiring huge investments in infrastructure. Therefore, the AIIB works as a 
complement to the existing regional and world multilateral development institutions.  
 
1.4. The Significance of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ 
1.4.1. Leading the New Pattern of the Economic Development in China 
There are still many issues with regard to Chinese development. For instance, the 
regional unbalanced development of China’s Eastern and Western regions, caused by 
differences in geographical position and respective recourses, as well as by national 
policies; the irrational economic structure has caused serious sacrifices to China in 
terms of natural resources and the environment; the development of the third sector is 
lagging behind, which is caused by the irrational industrial structure; although in the 
past decade the Chinese third sector has made great progress (Economic Daily, 2018), 
 38 
there is still a significant distance compared to the level of developed countries; the 
existing unbalance and lack of coordination between urban and rural development, and 
the gap is constantly increasing. China has achieved rapid economic growth as a direct 
benefit from the Chinese economic reform policy, and now the B&R Initiative will 
foster the development of a new pattern for the Chinese economic reform policy, to 
conform with the demands of China’s regional balanced development and to create new 
points for economic growth (Song, 2015, p.31). 
In the past, China mainly focused on the development of its eastern coastal areas. 
The Silk Road Economic Belt will now trigger the development of the western area, 
under the Chinese economic reform policy, and will open the country to the central and 
western regions of Asia. In other words, the BRI provides a solution to the unbalanced 
and uncoordinated economic and social development between the eastern, central and 
western regions of China (Li & Li, 2015, p.56). 
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road will continue to expand the hinterland and 
the market for economic development in the eastern region of China. To promote 
industrial restructuring and economic transformation, and to allow the efficient 
allocation of existing resources, the market can be further integrated, and new forces of 
economic growth can be promoted, to support the sustainable and stable development 
of the Chinese economy. 
The B&R also provides a solution to the overcapacity issue and to the adjustment 
of China’s industrial structure. Currently, industries such as the steel and cement 
industries suffer from overcapacity in China, but these industries still have market 
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space in less developed countries along the B&R route. The B&R will promote these 
industries to “go out”, which conforms to the demands of countries with an imperfect 
industrial structure. Additionally, it can also effectively alleviate overcapacity issues in 
China, thus promoting the process of industrial restructuring (Pei & Yu, 2015). 
Moreover, it will reduce the risk of unnecessary destructive confrontation with the 
US (zhongnanhai), and China will be able to fill the present economic and security 
spaces (Pantucci, R. & Lain, S., 2016, p. 9). 
 
1.4.2. Promoting prosperity and development of countries along the route 
The B&R will form a trans-regional economic cooperation network, as it creates 
both new opportunities for economic and social development in China, and benefits for 
countries and regions along the route. The B&R Initiative seeks mutual benefits - it 
aims at considering the interests as well as the advantages and potentials of all 
participant countries for building mutual beneficial connections for China and for the 
other countries and regions along the route (Cheng, 2015). Actual achievement of road, 
maritime channels, power grids, and communications connections will be conducive to 
enhanced cross-border communications between countries and regions along the route, 
therefore benefiting trade, and eventually promoting the development and prosperity of 
countries along the route (National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015, 
p. 2). 
 40 
The B&R promotes extensive cooperation between participating countries and 
regions in various fields, especially in the field of trade. Construction of the B&R 
infrastructure will form an international logistics cooperation network across the 
Eurasian continent, thus enhancing the convenience of trade between states, thanks to 
the B&R framework. The Silk Road Economic Belt includes division of labour 
between different hubs by fostering numerous logistic parks, gradually building a 
logistics industry with scale effects and a radiation service system with a channel 
function. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road connects various cities along the 
countries involved, to achieve an interconnected network between the interior and 
coastal areas, gradually forming a competitive international logistics channel to support 
and promote the development of other industries (Wang, 2014). 
 
1.4.3. Promoting Global Sustainable Development 
The subprime mortgage crisis seriously hindered world economic development. 
Although it has been a decade since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the negative 
influence still remains. 
The current global economic recovery is still weak; the emerging powers are 
challenging the original international order; relations between the greater powers are 
moving towards uncertainty; and regional conflicts are intensifying. The international 
security situation has deteriorated; unstable factors constitute a threat to the 
development of various countries and even to the world. Although economic 
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globalization greatly promoted the development of social productivity, it also deepened 
the polarization of social wealth. Under this background, China proposed the B&R 
Initiative to advocate peaceful development, and to promote cooperation and mutual 
benefit, which will contribute to the development of the states along the route, and at 
global level (Li & Cui, 2015). 
The B&R Initiative offers an opportunity for global development, especially for 
less developed countries and regions. The initiative may become a new driving force 
for world economic growth, and provide an impetus for global sustainable development 
(Bai, 2015). The B&R commits to developing the fields of infrastructures, economy 
and culture, to promoting regional prosperity, and reducing poverty, thus contributing 
to mitigate international security threats, which can be considered as a new scope of 
global governance (CCTV, 2017). 
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2. The Development of China-EU Relations in the Twenty-first Century 
The advent of the 21st Century brought about new opportunities for bilateral 
political relations between China and the EU. From 1998 to 2008, the two sides built a 
constructive partnership. During those 10 years, China-EU relations were continuously 
rising. In 2001, the two sides established a comprehensive partnership agreement, 
which then became a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2003. There were frequent 
mutual visits between Chinese and EU leaders. The year of 2005 was labelled as 
China’s “European Year” (Guan, 2005). Since 2006, within the scope of the 
comprehensive strategic partnership, China-EU relations entered a period of 
competition and partnership. The EU began requesting that China take up more 
responsibilities, which gradually highlighted some instability factors in China-EU 
relations, and the friction between both sides increased. 
In the beginning of 2002, the formal circulation of the Euro meant that the EU had 
accomplished its monetary integration, meaning that the overall economic strength of 
the EU has been enhanced. Meanwhile, the continuous development of China’s 
economy had created a growing political and economic impact on the region and the 
world. China’s foreign policy was becoming more active and constructive. 
In September 2003 the European Commission introduced a policy document, 
“EU-China Relations: A Maturing Partnership”. The document reiterates five 
objectives of the EU policy towards China, reviews the implementation of the action 
plans of 1998 and 2001, and also formulates a strategy for the development of 
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EU-China relations in the following three years (European Commission, 2003). As a 
response, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a document on October 13th, 
which was the first document issued in its history of foreign relations, namely, “China’s 
Policy Paper on the EU” publicly expressing, for the first time, China’s interests and 
goals in the relations between China and the EU (China Government, 2003). The 
European Union responded promptly on October 14th - through the President of the 
European Commission, Romano Prodi - saying that the “China’s Policy Paper on the 
EU would contribute to further strengthening the dialogue and cooperation between the 
EU and China,” also, he stated, “the EU would consider the proposals issued in the 
document” (People’s Daily, 2003). 
The year of 2005 was the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the establishment 
of diplomatic relations between China and the EU. The positive affirmation of bilateral 
relations had reached its peak; the political leaders of both sides affirmed that the 
relations between China and the EU are at its best in history, and decided to establish a 
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. However, at that time, uncoordinated voice 
began to emerge. The European Parliament adopted the Annual Report on Human 
Rights in the World for 2004 on April 28, 2005 (European Parliament, 2005b). The EU 
policy towards China on this matter was as follows: “Welcomes the fact that China is 
engaging with the EU in the human rights dialogue; asks Member State governments, 
the Commission and China to use this dialogue as a real opportunity to bring about 
changes in the internal policies of China, where major human rights concerns continue 
to exist, in particular concerning the use of the death penalty and the suppression of 
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freedom of association and religion; stresses that an increasingly positive trade 
relationship must be contingent on human rights reforms; is concerned at the recent 
reversal of EU policy by the Council in relation to the embargo on arms sales to China, 
and strongly recommends that the arms embargo remain intact until greater progress is 
made on human rights issues; calls for an official reassessment of the Tiananmen 
events2 by the Chinese authorities, the publication of the list of political prisoners and 
their unconditional release; notes with concern the treatment of people in Tibet and 
Xinjiang in the areas of the freedom of association and religion (European Parliament, 
2005a).” 
Actually, during the years of 2004 and 2005, the EU received much pressure from 
the USA when the EU prevaricated on lifting the arms embargo on China – in place 
since 1989 – which would soon be lifted, especially with the support of France and 
German. (In the Spring of 2004, French and German leaders noted publicly that the 
embargo was an anachronism and should be abandoned). The lifting of the arms export 
embargo on China gradually became a triangular political issue, leading to a 
trans-Atlantic debate. Washington threatened that the EU’s response to this issue would 
be seen as a test to its loyalty. The resulting internal dissension within the EU scuttled 
the lifting of the embargo, and instead intensified USA-EU joint consultations and 
intelligence sharing on China. (Barysch, Grant and Leonard, 2005, p. 13, 17; Godement, 
                                               
2 In 1989, a wave of liberalization was launched in Chinese society. Liberalists promoting democracy and liberty; advancing of the 
anti-Communist Party of China and anti-socialist activities. A number of college students marched in protests in the capital city and 
in other cities. Some unscrupulous people took the opportunity to disturb the social order (such as by engaging in robbery, violence, 
destroying social property, committing arson), and the protests quickly developed into turmoil. In the end, the turmoil was 
suppressed by the Chinese government, which caused international opprobrium, and as a response, the EU put in place arms 
embargo on China. 
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2005; Gomper, Godment, Medeiros and Mulvenon, 2005, p. 45-47). 
Besides, the tendency for EU’s trade protectionism towards China was intensified. 
The EU does still not recognize China’s market economy status, and various trade 
disputes have been frequently exposed. For instance, in the summer of 2005, the ‘textile 
wars’ - also referred to as the ‘bra wars’ between the EU and China - have been blown 
out of proportion (White and Gow, 2005). According to The Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC), after the ten-year transition period of ATC implementation, trade in 
textile and clothing products is no longer subject to quotas under a special regime 
outside normal WTO/GATT rules. Thus, all the restrictions ended on January 1 2005, 
and thus trade will continue under the general rules and disciplines embodied in the 
multilateral trading system (WTO, 1994), which means that as of January 1 2005, 
bilateral trade between both regions will automatically continue under the general rules 
and disciplines embodied in the multilateral trading system.  
In 2005, the EU, responding to the high-growth of textile imports from China, 
called for a bilateral meeting, and the two sides engaged in consultations on the exports 
of certain Chinese textile and clothing products to the EU in Shanghai, China, and 
eventually concluded an agreement on June 10, 2005 (Cronin, 2005; European 
Commission, 2005). After the agreement was signed, about 80m items of 
Chinese-made clothes blocked at European ports were released. Stuart Newman, the 
FTA’s legal adviser, said: “The reason why we have a backlog is that the quota levels 
were set too low (before the Shanghai agreement).” The new agreement, brokered by 
EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson, and his Chinese counterpart, Bo Xilai, was 
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achieved after more than 24 hours of tense negotiations in Beijing (White and Gow, 
2005). 
On October 24 2006, the European Commission issued a statement entitled, 
“Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
EU-China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities”, the EU’s sixth policy paper on 
China with an attached paper on trade issues entitled ‘Accompanying COM (2006) 631 
Final: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities, A Policy Paper on EU-China Trade 
and Investment: Competition and Partnership’. This was the first policy document to 
China from the European Commission at that time. The document considered China 
one of the most important EU partners, and the rise of China was welcomed once again. 
It stated that a closer and stronger strategic partnership was in line with the interests of 
both the EU and China (European Commission, 2006a). In 2005, there was a trade 
friction between China and the EU, however, as Mandelson argued, far from being at 
war, China and Europe are building stronger ties as each other’s first or second trading 
partner (White and Gow, 2005). In the accompanying policy document, the EU 
confirmed the benefits of mutually open markets between China and the EU. In the 
meantime, the EU believed that the competition with China posed serious challenges to 
EU member states in some important manufacturing sectors. Both EU documents had 
requested China to learn more from European values and legal concepts, to respect the 
vested interests of the EU at global level. Meanwhile, it also demanded that China 
strengthen its protection of intellectual property, and pointed out that China should take 
up more responsibilities and expectations (European Commission, 2006b). 
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In 2007, the EU released the ‘China Strategy Paper, 2007-2013’. This document 
reviewed cooperation with China under the “Chinese National Guidance Outline” in 
2002-2006, and introduced existing departmental dialogues and cooperation projects. It 
listed three main objectives for EU policies on China, aimed at providing support to 
China in the fields of the environment, climate issues, and human resources 
development, in which fields China and the EU established sectorial dialogues (EEAS, 
2013). 
Along with the relations between both sides achieving a more mature stage, there 
were also some unstable factors and frictions between China and the EU. In 2008, the 
Tibetan unrest incidents broke out. On March 14, protesters - some in monks’ robes and 
some yelling independence slogans - torched vehicles, attacked banks and offices, and 
used stones and knives against the police in Lhasa, and the unrest spread outside the 
region onto Chinese provinces neighbouring Tibet (The New York Times, 2008). The 
Chinese government eventually quelled the unrest and punished separatists and 
violence according to Chinese law, while the EU’s human rights report accused the 
Chinese government of torturing and mistreating prisoners. Some Media conducted 
vigorous propaganda on the Tibet issue, even resorting to false reports. Thus, the 
EU-China Summit conference was suspended in 2008. 
Furthermore, the EU and the United States had signed a joint declaration 
denouncing issues on human rights violations in China. Later, the Olympic torch relay 
(Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics) was hindered in London and Paris. In the same year, 
in the beginning of December, the EU issued its “anti-dumping measures” towards 
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China. 
Under China’s outcry against, during the rotating presidency of the EU, French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy said that, as the French President and even within the 
rotating presidency of the EU he is free to meet the Dalai Lama, which conforms to his 
values and convictions (Zheng, 2010). This behaviour eventually led to the delay of the 
“11th EU-China summit”. At the end of 2008, the subprime crisis broke out in the 
United States and evolved into a global economic storm. That was a new turning point 
that emerged in the China-EU relations, when both had to confront this common crisis. 
In 2009, China-EU relations were back on the right track after a turbulent year. 
Confronted with the great impact of the financial crisis, China and the EU leaders 
realized that the stalemate between China and EU was not in the interest of both sides. 
The incumbent Prime Minister of the China State Council, Wen Jiabao, visited Europe. 
In May of that same year both sides held the ‘11th China-EU Summit’ in Prague, Czech 
Republic. In the joint press communiqué issued after the meeting, the leaders of China 
and the EU pledged to fully implement the statement of the “G20 London Summit 
20093”, resisting and opposing various forms of protectionism. After that, Mr Wen 
Jiabao visited Europe once again expressing China’s highest attention to the China-EU 
relations (Wu, 2009). 
In November 2009, the 11th China-EU Summit, after several zigzags, was showing 
                                               
3 G20 leaders met to tackle the financial crisis. “Under the UK Presidency of the G20, Leaders pledged to do “whatever [was] 
necessary” to restore confidence, growth, and jobs, repair the financial system to restore lending, strengthen financial regulation to 
rebuild trust, fund and reform international financial institutions to overcome the crisis and prevent future ones, promote global 
trade and investment and reject protectionism, and finally, to build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery.” (OECD, 2009) 
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an unprecedented global strategic height, which was affirmed in a subsequent joint 
document stating that “in the context of the complex and changing international status, 
China-EU relations are increasingly transcending the bilateral scope and have 
international significance”. So far the responses to “climate change, financial crisis, 
energy and resource security, food security, environment and public health security, 
anti-terrorism”, as well as the “severe global challenges”, such as weapon of mass 
destruction, transnational organized crime, and major infectious diseases, serve as the 
direction for China-EU cooperation and as an impetus to further enhance the relations 
from bilateral to a global level (China Government, 2009). The strategic positioning of 
each other has been enhanced, and China and the EU strengthened their cooperation in 
regional and global governance. 
It is a tricky bridge to build, and there is much suspicion and disbelief to overcome. 
In order to handle the phenomena of lagging behind social interaction and social 
communication between both sides, in 2012, the ‘14th China-EU Summit’ decided to 
establish a high-level dialogue mechanism between China and EU as the third pillar to 
be pursued, in parallel with the China-EU political and strategic dialogue and the 
high-level economic and trade forum. China and the EU announced the establishment 
of the “The EU-China Urbanisation Partnership” in 2012, focusing on promoting 
exchanges and cooperation in the field of urban sustainable development (European 
Commission, 2012; China Government, 2012a). Both sides held their first ‘High Level 
Meeting on Energy Security’ in May of 2012, agreed to strengthen exchanges of 
experience in the implementation of the energy strategy, to participate in global energy 
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governance, and to jointly build a safe, stable, economic, clean and diversified energy 
supply system (China Government, 2012b). 
On the November 21st 2013, the Premier of the Chinese State Council, Li 
Keqiang, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, 
and the President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, co-chaired the ‘16th 
China-EU Summit’ in the Great Hall of the People, a main location for political 
activities in Beijing. As a result, the two parties jointly issued the ‘EU-China 2020 
Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’. This strategic agenda defines the common goals 
of China-EU cooperation in the fields of peace and security, prosperity, sustainable 
development, and people to people exchanges. It outlined the promotion of further 
development of the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership in the ensuing 
years. (EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, 2013, p.3-16). The 
‘EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’ became a programmatic 
document to integrate the development strategy of both sides. The agenda covers 13 
areas of cooperation in the field of peace and security4, 28 areas of economic and 
                                               
4 Cooperation in the field of peace and security: 1. Consult fully and effectively on major bilateral, regional and international issues 
of mutual concern. 2. Strengthen dialogue and communication on international and regional issues with major implications at 
global level. 3. Reinforce cooperation in all relevant trans-regional and regional fora. 4. Reinforce cooperation in multilateral fora. 
5. Strengthen coordination and cooperation, working for just, reasonable, and effective rules in key fields. 6. Reinforce cooperation 
on promoting nuclear security. 7. Support and promote the establishment of a peaceful, secure, resilient and open cyber space, 
promoting mutual trust and cooperation through such platforms as the EU-China Cyber Taskforce. 8. Deepen exchanges on human 
rights at bilateral and international level on the basis of equality and mutual respect. 9. Strengthen EU-China cooperation under the 
framework of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. 10. Hold regular dialogue meetings on defense and security policy, increase training exchanges, and gradually raise the 
level of EU-China dialogue and cooperation on defense and security, advancing towards more practical cooperation. 11. Continue 
the existing cooperation on maritime security, including on counter-piracy, and conduct joint counter-piracy exercises. 12. Develop 
joint activities to promote maritime safety and security; share expertise related to relevant international law; develop exchanges on 
the Artic, including joint research projects. 13. Intensify cooperation with a view to promoting and facilitating the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. (European Commission, 2013) 
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trade cooperation, as well as cooperation in trade and investment, industry and 
information, agriculture, transportation, and infrastructure. And also in science and 
technology innovation, energy and towns, and in the field of sustainable development. 
There are 39 areas of cooperation in 10 different aspects, as well as two major 
projects, and 10 cooperation projects in human communication. In addition, China 
and the EU also strengthened exchanges and cooperation on the cyber space and on 
the existing platforms, such as the China-EU Cyber Taskforce. Moreover, the agenda 
achieved consensus on cooperation in the carbon emissions trading system, and on 
resuming cooperation in spatial science and technology (China State Council, 2013), 
which marks the highest achievement in the China-EU strategy. 
From March 22 to April 1 2014, the current Chinese leader, Xi Jinping attended 
the third “Nuclear Security Summit” in The Hague, Holland. Later, he made a state visit 
to four European Union member states, namely to the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
and Belgium, and also visited the headquarters of UNESCO and the headquarters of the 
European Union. The visit established a new status in bilateral political relations 
(China Embassy, 2014). Mr Xi’s visit to the European Union headquarters was the first 
visit ever made by a Chinese leader. Subsequently, China and the EU jointly issued the 
‘Joint Statement on Deepening the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for 
Mutual Benefit’, which expressed the desire to establish a new era of stable and healthy 
development of political relations between China and the EU, and to establish peace, 
growth, reform, and civilization as the four main partnerships (Zhang, 2014). On the 
March 31st 2013, Xi Jinping stated that China and the EU are the “two major forces, 
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two major markets and two major civilizations” in the world, during the meeting with 
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy. During the visit to the EU 
headquarters in March 2014, Mr Xi Jinping proposed as “precepts for China-EU 
relations from a strategic perspective, to combine the two major forces, the two major 
markets, and the two major civilizations to jointly develop partnerships for peace, 
growth, reform and civilization, pointing the strategic direction for China-EU relations 
and contributing towards world development and prosperity” (Xinhua net, 2014; 
European Council, 2014). In the subsequent official documents issued by China, the 
‘Four Partnerships’ were explained in detail, and for the first time China-EU relations 
have been clearly defined as “an integral part of China’s efforts to build long-term, 
steady and healthy relations with major powers, and a priority for its foreign policy,” 
and that “the Chinese government places high importance on the status and role of the 
EU” (China Government, 2014a, p. 3). In the context of a constantly changing 
international security landscape, it is significant for China and the EU to strengthen 
dialogue and cooperation in the security field. China and the EU unanimously agree to 
further enhance China-EU dialogue and cooperation on national security and defence. 
As one of the achievements of Mr Xi’s state visit, the ‘EU-China dialogue and 
cooperation on defence and security meeting’ was held in October 2014, and high-level 
exchanges were conducted. Security dialogue, personnel training, international 
peacekeeping, maritime escort, and promotion of peace and security in Africa became 
the main topics of common concern (European Commission, 2014). 
The B&R Initiative became integrated into the EU’s development strategy 
 53 
(European Commission, 2015; Ministry of Commerce of China, 2014). In the context 
of the B&R Initiative and the Investment Plan for Europe (‘Junker Plan’), China and 
the EU promoted three main coupling points according to the 17th China-EU Summit in 
2015, namely between initiatives launched by the EU and China. The B&R Initiative is 
in line with the European development strategy, China’s global cooperation on 
production capacity is in line with the EU’s Investment Plan for Europe, and the “16+1 
framework” with Central and Eastern European countries is in direct contact with 
China-EU cooperation. In addition, in that same year, in the arduous negotiations to 
reach the Paris Agreement there were important contributions made by both China and 
the EU (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). 
 
2.1. Implementation Issues of China-EU Relations 
Since the beginning of the 21th Century, China and the EU aimed at promoting 
healthy, stable bilateral relations. China-EU relations evolved from a strategic 
partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership, which demonstrates a positive 
trend in China-EU relations. However, there are still several friction points and 
instability factors that remain in China-EU relations, and that have a deep impact on 
China-EU relations. This chapter will focus on these issues, with the intention of 
highlighting the five main impediments on China-EU relations, in order to further 
understand China-EU relations. 
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2.2.1. Value Discrepancies between China and the EU 
As far as its political system, China is a communist state, which is essentially 
different from the capitalist states of the EU. The existing differences in terms of 
culture, values and ideology had created an intrinsic mutually recognised gap, barriers, 
and even frictions in bilateral relations. In details, there are still tensions between the 
EU and China regarding each other’s perceptions on norms and values. Underlying the 
EU’s engagement has been an emphasis on civil society and human security, which 
contrasts with China’s preference for regime stability and state-centric security 
concepts (Chiasy and Zhou, 2017, p.47). 
For instance, human rights issues have been repeatedly criticized by the EU in 
various ways, which have been influenced by the different ideologies to a considerable 
extent. The EU merely makes it estimates based on its own concept of values, in order 
to make criticisms on Chinese human rights issues, although China holds a different 
opinion on these issues (Ren, 2008, p. 89-90). Besides, the existing national conditions 
in China are greatly different from those of EU member states. China is a unified 
multi-ethnic state. Its territorial extension ranks second in the world, and is the world’s 
most populous country, with a population of around 1.404 billion (UN, 2017, p. 18). 
There are 56 ethnic groups in China, with many different religions and cultural 
traditions among the different ethnic groups. Within these groups, there are Chinese 
followers of the three main religions in the world, namely Christianity, Islam and 
Buddhism, plus of other minority religions as well, which is totally different from the 
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national contexts of EU member states. 
2.2.2. Internal Differences Between EU Member States 
As a result of the continuous progress in European integration, as of January 1st 
2018, the number of EU member states is presently 28. Although the Brexit procedure 
began on March 29 2017, the UK is still a EU member state as of March 29 2019. The 
overall strength of the EU has been growing as the number of members grows. 
However, with the expansion of the EU, due to the existing differences in history, 
traditional culture, and level of economic development, the contradictions in terms of 
interests among member states have also become increasingly prominent. Driven by 
each one’s own interests, their respective positions on some issues are inevitably 
divergent, which limits the functioning of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). 
The “arms embargo” policy on China was agreed in 1989, although, in actuality, 
“the European Union had no common position on what items were covered under the 
expression ‘arms embargo’. Therefore, it was up to individual member states to 
interpret the embargo within the context of their national laws, regulations and decision 
making processes” (SIPRI, 1997). There was a possibility of lifting the arms ban in 
2005 (Financial Times, 2005), but the “arms embargo” is still existing until now, and is 
one of the main issues causing internal disagreements between EU member states. 
Whether to lift the “arms embargo” on China is a controversial issue for EU member 
states, as both active support and strong opposition to lifting the “arms embargo” 
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coexist (Cendrowiz, 2012). According to the provisions of the European Union on 
diplomatic and security affairs, lifting of the “arms embargo” on China has to be agreed 
upon by all member states, and to be approved by all member states, which has caused 
the failure of lifting the “arms embargo.” 
Regarding whether to acknowledge China’s Market Economy Status (MES), there 
are differences among EU member states on their positions, caused by the different 
requirements imposed by different industries on this issue. Each EU member state puts 
particular emphasis on certain industries, and therefore it is difficult for the EU to reach 
a consensus on this issue (Steinbock, 2016). 
The decisions of the EU on many issues in China-EU relations largely depend on 
the position of all member states, thus the internal divisions among EU member states 
constitute a negative impact on China-EU relations. 
 
2.2.3. The American Interference Factor 
The alliance formed between the EU and the United States since the Cold War, 
namely NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) – known as “the American 
defensive “umbrella” – provided an easy defence and security solution for Europe, but 
it also left it without the ability to take autonomous military actions (Demetriou, 2016, 
p. 4).” 
As stated in the “Summary of the 2018 national defence strategy of The United 
States of America”: 
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“Fortify the Trans-Atlantic NATO Alliance. A strong and free Europe, bound 
by shared principles of democracy, national sovereignty, and commitment to 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is vital to our security. The alliance will 
deter Russian adventurism, defeat terrorists who seek to murder innocents, 
and address the arc of instability building on NATO’s periphery. At the same 
time, NATO must adapt to remain relevant and fit for our time – in purpose, 
capability, and responsive decision-making. We expect European allies to 
fulfil their commitments to increase defence and modernization spending to 
bolster the alliance in the face of our shared security concerns (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2018, p. 9).” 
Although the EU and the US have points of disagreement, as mentioned above, the 
U.S. requires European allies to “increase defence and modernization spending.” The 
other issue of disagreement relates to each area’s response to Climate Change. Due to 
“the Presidential decree that the Paris Climate Accord “demeaned” American 
sovereignty and unfairly burdened the U.S. economy. The United States was saying 
goodbye [to the Paris Agreement]” (Palmer, 2017). And therefore the Trump 
administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement. On the EU side, certainly, 
considering the EU’s leadership in global governance, it covered the issue of Climate 
Change. For instance, “Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council, described 
Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris pact as a big mistake, but said the fight against 
climate change would continue with or without the US” (Boffey, Connolly & Asthana, 
2017). 
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However, the existing differences did not have any major impact on the US-EU 
alliance. The EU and the US still maintain a relationship of solid allies, which 
demonstrates that their common interests far outweigh their differences. In addition, in 
response to Climate Change, China has the same aspirations as the European Union. 
Furthermore, Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang, told reporters that “China believed 
in abiding by international rules. There have been changes in the international situation 
and there have been rising uncertainties and destabilising factors, and in such 
circumstances it is important for China-EU relations to become more stable (Boffey, 
Connolly & Asthana, 2017).” 
As far as China–United States relations, the United States is still the first 
superpower in the world. China has risen to the second largest economy in the world, 
and its comprehensive national strength continues to increase, and both nations play an 
important role in world peace and development, with frequent contacts and close 
co-operation that continued throughout recent years in bilateral economic and trade 
relations, with a wide range of common interests (Ye, 2015, p. 222-227). However, 
China was described as a strategic competitor in the “Summary of the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy of the United States of America”: 
“Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the 
principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and 
sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to 
U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to 
increase in the future.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2).” 
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In the same year, in March 22, US President Donald John Trump signed the 
“Presidential Memorandum on the Actions by the United States Related to the Section 
301 Investigation”, under which the US conducted a unilateral investigation on trade 
with China. The investigation involves 60 billion US dollars (Trump, 2018). The 
Chinese side stated that the US unilateral tariff survey violates the spirit of the WTO. 
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying said that, “as to the Section 301 
investigation, we do not hope to have a trade war with anyone, but we are never afraid 
of it. We have the confidence and capability to cope with any challenge. We hope the 
US will take cautious decisions and avoid placing China-US trade relations in danger” 
(Hua, 2018). 
Furthermore, the US Congress passed the “Taiwan Travel Act,” which caused 
strong dissatisfaction in China (Zhou, 2018). The Taiwan issue is a legacy issue from 
the Cold War. Taiwan was part of China. During the period between 1927 and 1949, 
there were two civil wars in China, the first for ten years, and the second for four years. 
One of the consequences of the final war was that the defeated KMT (Kuomintang, is a 
major capitalist political party in Taiwan) retreated and dominated Taiwan, and this 
opposition between China and Taiwan still exists until nowadays. Thus, the “Taiwan 
Travel Act” was a cause of tension between China and the United States. Comparing 
the relations between China, the EU and the United States, EU-US relations are most 
intimate and stable. The firmness of EU-US relations is incomparable to China-EU 
relations. As a consequence, the US has had a long-term major impact on China-EU 
relations. 
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Returning to the issue of the EU arms embargo on China, as mentioned before, 
apart from internal disagreements among EU member states, there is also the 
involvement of the US. In 2005, while the EU was beginning to consider to lift the arms 
embargo on China, in April that same year, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. 
Zoellick visited the EU, and said that lifting the EU arms embargo on China was not 
conducive to the interests of the US. Then in June, Lockheed Martin, one of the largest 
US arms giants, threatened the EU that if it would lift the ban, the United States would 
interrupt several military cooperation projects with the European Union (Zhang, 2007, 
p. 112). Also, “given that 19 EU member states are also NATO allies, this could worsen 
US-European tensions within the alliance” (US Department of Defense, 2018, p.26). In 
the end, the EU arms embargo on China failed to be lifted, and the American 
interference factor cannot be ignored in that outcome. The US became a strong external 
force opposing the lifting of the ban, which led to the failure of lifting the EU arms 
embargo on China. 
2.2.4. The EU Lacks Trust in China 
From a long-term perspective, the existing issues and frictions between China and 
the EU have constituted a negative impact on the development of China-EU relations. 
Such as for instance the human rights issue, the MES, as well as the EU arms embargo 
on China, all still remain as and are negative aspects on China-EU relations. That is, the 
existence of these issues has led to EU’s distrust on China, or has had implications on 
the EU’s distrust on China. In recent years, the achievements of China’s economic and 
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social development have significantly improved its hard power and soft power, which 
have changed the original gap between China and the EU. As China has become 
increasingly active on the international stage, the EU has become full of doubts as to 
whether China can rise peacefully as a world power, as it asserts. Whether the rise of 
China constitutes an actual “threat” to the EU is an on-going debate. On the one hand, 
the actual concerns stem from four main aspects: 
1. Militarily, the development of China’s armament is unprecedented. 
Chinese military spending keeps increasing, and the military power of 
China is greatly enhanced. 
2. Economically, China is accused of its lack of intellectual property rights 
and increasing deterioration of environmental issues. 
3. The influence of China’s economic power in the world has increased 
and arisen many problems. Such as China’s presence in Africa, being 
criticized as neo-colonialism; China is America's biggest foreign 
creditor; and in Europe, various acquisitions and investments made by 
China are criticized as “colonization by stealth”. 
4. China has been considered as a direct threat to European and US hopes 
of spreading democratic values (Debating Europe, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, there are also positive facts stemming from four other 
main aspects: 
1. China is an “engine of the world economy.” Its economic achievements 
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have contributed to keep the world economy afloat, and Chinese 
spending power has greatly increased as well. China’s rise offers 
boundless opportunities to the rest of the world. 
2. The existence of China is a force for stability in the world. 
3. The rise of China tends to lead to a multi-polar world. 
4. In turn, if there is no rise of China, that is, if China is fragile and poor, 
the “China threat” will become a serious issue for this world. If China’s 
growth were to grind to a halt, sparking social unrest among its 1.3 
billion people, the world might really have something to fear (Debating 
Europe, 2012). 
Although China and the EU established a comprehensive strategic partnership as 
early as 2003, bilateral economic and trade cooperation has only made great progress in 
recent years. “China is the EU’s biggest source of imports and its second-biggest export 
market. China and Europe trade on average over €1 billion a day” (European 
Commission, 2018a). China and the EU have established a number of consultation 
mechanisms; frequent interactions in official and unofficial fora; bilateral relations had 
a sustained development, however, political mutual trust between China and the EU 
does not keep up with the development of economic relations. In the field of EU 
investment in China, there is the Chinese domestic environment issue, which China still 
needs to improve further. Furthermore, the EU also has concerns about the rapid 
expansion of China’s investment in Europe, “Europe is pushing for more stringent 
vetting of foreign investments, with an eye on Beijing” (Alderman, 2018). Also, the 
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European Commission has been taking decisions to extend its anti-dumping measures 
on Chinese steel products (European Commission, 2018c). 
In terms of practical policies, the governments of EU member states have 
strengthened their economic cooperation with China. However, EU institutions and 
public opinion play a balancing role. Strengthening cooperation with China in the 
economic and trade fields to get rid of the crisis has gradually become the mainstream 
practice in the development of relations between EU member states and China. 
Nonetheless, the cognitive orientation of EU member states towards China still remains 
an unresolved issue, oscillating between “challengers” and “partner.” In particular, 
European interest groups and public opinion on China are more negative and alarming. 
On the one hand, in order to maintain an international strategic balance, the EU 
expects that China should be strong, but on the other hand, the EU might not appreciate 
the rapid rise of China, as it is concerned that the growing power of China will place the 
EU at a disadvantage in strategic competition, and even pose a threat to EU member 
states. The prominent criticism on China on the existing ‘16+1 cooperation framework’ 
(further discussed in Chapter 3), that includes China and 16 Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries (newer, poorer members, Fig.3) – and although China’s 
position has been of consistently supporting the integration of Europe – is that this 
framework is criticized for splitting Europe (Kynge & Peel, 2017). As mentioned 
before, when confronting issues related to China, EU member States form internal 
division groups, and therefore, China’s diplomacy with the EU has also established 
cooperation with different member states and on different subjects - the ‘16+1 
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cooperation framework’ is one of such examples. 
Fig.3: China’s 16+1 grouping built around EU’s newer, poorer members 
 
(Sourse:https://www.ft.com/content/16abbf2a-cf9b-11e7-9dbb-291a884dd8c6) 
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Table 1: Foci of EU’s China Policy, 1975-2012 (Reuben, 2013) 
 
(Source: https://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-europeenne-2013-1-page-158.htm)
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3. The Role of EU in the B&R Initiative 
Europe is a critical region in the B&R Initiative. As mentioned in the ‘Vision and 
Action,’ “the Belt and Road runs through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, 
connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle as one terminal, developing the 
European economic circle as the other terminal, and the surrounding countries have a 
huge potential possibility for economic development” (National Development and 
Reform Commission et al., 2015). 
There are two main relevant lines for China and Europe regarding the B&R 
construction. First, the main link is a ‘New Eurasian Land Bridge’, the railway-based 
transport corridor. The train lines start in different regions in China, and the trains reach 
London and Madrid, which are the southernmost terminals in Europe. The second is the 
connection between the coastal cities in South-eastern China and the main coastal cities 
in Europe, namely the terminal is the port of Piraeus in Greece. Therefore, the B&R 
involves a wide range of states in the European region, including Central and Eastern 
Europe, as well as Western Europe. 
Europe is the one of the terminal destinations of the B&R route. The projects 
under the B&R framework require extensive participation by the European region. In 
the final round of negotiations and examination of the B&R projects the EU is in charge 
of the region of EU member states, and therefore, the EU plays a crucial role in the 
implementation of the B&R. 
According to the evaluation made by the EU, China is presently the EU’s 
 60 
second-biggest trading partner, just behind the United States (European Commission, 
2017). From 2004 to 2017, the EU remained as China’s largest trading partner. By the 
end of 2015, China had established 2,300 enterprises in the EU through direct 
investment, covering all 28 EU member states and employing nearly 90,000 local 
employees (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2015, p. 7). There is no doubt that 
comprehensive and in-depth cooperation between both major economies will bring a 
new vitality to global economic development. 
In order to alleviate the pressure of the European debt crisis, EU member states are 
looking for a way to get out of the financial crisis, and to revitalize the economy. Both, 
the more developed Western European states and the less developed Central and 
Eastern European states are in urgent need of funds and of other economic resources to 
advance their development projects and to revitalize their economies. On the other 
hand, the broad market space in Europe under the B&R will help repair the issues of 
overcapacity and economic structural upgrading in China. 
Undoubtedly, the response and attitude of the EU to the B&R Initiative is a major 
factor affecting the implementation of the B&R in Europe.  
In the beginning, when the B&R was proposed, there were diverging voices from 
the international community. As one of the terminals of the B&R, and since it is a 
region with significant international influence, the EU’s perception and practical 
response to the B&R will greatly affect the opinions of other states on the initiative, as 
well as that of the international community. 
Furthermore, European countries can cooperate with China in the markets outside 
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the EU and outside China, which will greatly promote mutual cooperation under the 
B&R. Overall, there is an obvious development gap among the countries along the 
B&R framework. As the origin and the destination points of the B&R, China and 
Europe are relatively stable regions, with a relatively high degree of economic 
development. However, in the regions along the B&R route, the overall degree of 
economic and technological development is relatively low, and there are many complex 
social issues. 
On the other hand, there are different development advantages between European 
countries and China. China’s main advantages lie in labour, capital and a powerful state 
apparatus. It has shown its unique advantages in mobilizing resources from various 
national sectors, in order to concentrate them on major events, and in promoting 
economic growth and maintaining social stability. The EU is a normative power with 
economic strength, very advanced in science and technology, as well as in management 
concepts. Actually, there are no direct geopolitical conflicts between China and the EU. 
There are certain differences in terms of interests, but there is still much common 
ground for pragmatic cooperation (Song, 2014). 
 
3.1. The Interactions Between China and the EU Since the B&R has been 
Proposed 
China defined the concept of the B&R Initiative in its ‘Vision and Action’, but the 
perception of the EU on the B&R is a crucial factor affecting its implementation, 
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especially in the European region. In order to understand the impact of B&R on 
China-EU relations, we need to know the perception gap between the EU and China on 
the B&R Initiative, and also to observe the practical responses and actions that have 
come up in the European region. 
There is has been a changing process in the EU’s response to the B&R Initiative. 
Based on a number of phenomena and data analysis, including observations of 
intergovernmental interactions, academic evaluations, and public opinion, EU’s 
response to the B&R Initiative can be broadly divided into three stages： 
In the first stage, from 2013 to the beginning of 2014, there were very few 
reactions from European countries to the B&R Initiative; then, from 2014 to mid-2015, 
a few European countries began to respond to the B&R, and project-based cooperation 
between China and European countries gradually began, and by the end of 2015, 
various projects under the B&R had been implemented in European countries. So we 
will consider the mid of 2015 until the present as the third stage, as for instance in 2018, 
the strategic document issued by the EU repeatedly mentioned strategic cooperation 
with China in the field of Eurasia connectivity. Furthermore, China has been mentioned 
more frequently than Japan, India, and ASEAN in this document (European 
Commission, 2018). 
The first stage refers to September 2013 to March 2014. By the end of 2013, the 
B&R Initiative launched by China had attracted a certain degree of attention within the 
international community. However, as observed, after the B&R was proposed, six 
months later, European countries still maintained doubts about the B&R. Both sides 
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had hardly any interaction related to the B&R Initiative. 
For instance, let us look at international conferences. In the end of 2013, the ‘16th 
EU-China Submit’ was held in Beijing, nevertheless, the B&R Initiative was excluded 
from the agenda of this conference, as well as from both sides’ jointly issued document 
‘EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’. Also, in public opinion, in 
research studies or in the literature, references to the B&R coming from European 
countries were very scarce. Throughout all relevant literature and comments, the B&R 
was mostly linked to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and to the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, which were regarded as just another one of a series of 
current Chinese foreign policy initiatives in the field of international cooperation. So 
the B&R had not been emphasized or highlighted anywhere. 
The following three reasons may help explain this phenomenon: the first is that 
in the beginning, in the initial proposal of the B&R Initiative, the Chinese government 
did not define the role of Europe. As the initiator of the B&R Initiative, China did not 
clarify or offer a clear signal to the EU, which is one of the main reasons why 
European countries were initially indifferent towards the B&R Initiative. The second, 
in this stage, was that the concept of the B&R has just been put forward. So European 
countries were not clear about various elements of the B&R, such as its potential for 
development, its strategic positioning, etc. Therefore, they maintained a cautious 
attitude. The third, we believe, is connected to the fact that the interests of the various 
EU member states are not uniform. Therefore, it was difficult for Europe as a whole 
to come up with a prompt and precise response to the B&R Initiative. 
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The second stage refers to the developments between March 2014 and June 2015. 
During this period, several European countries began to respond positively to the B&R 
Initiative, with Central and Eastern European countries being the main force. In the 
beginning of 2014, it is remarkable that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui 
said that “the B&R will be the two wings that will keep revitalizing Asia as a whole, 
and contribute to connecting the various regions of Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast 
Asia, West Asia to part of the European region” (Li, 2014). Thus this statement 
confirmed the strategic position of the European region within the B&R Initiative. 
The possible reasons for this transition are as follows: Firstly, during this period, 
under the context of the economic crisis, Central and Eastern European countries were 
in need of infrastructures, investment, and trade. Thus, cooperation with China under 
the B&R became an important path for most Central and Eastern European countries, in 
order to develop their economies and overcome the impact of the European debt crisis. 
In the construction of the B&R, the role of Central and Eastern Europe comes up not 
only as a logistics channel to connect to the traditional core European region, but also as 
an increasingly important investment and consumer market (Long, 2016, p. 119). 
Secondly, after 2012, under the annual meeting of the ‘16+1 framework,’ it continued 
to develop the interconnection between Central and Eastern European countries and 
China, which caused a positive impact on bilateral cooperation in this region. 
However, during this phase, China-EU cooperation under the B&R still 
maintained various negative issues. The first, among the countries that had responded 
positively, several doubts still remained on the specific implementation policy of the 
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B&R Initiative. For instance, in case of Slovakia, the government was concerned 
whether China would want to include Slovakia in the framework of the B&R Initiative, 
and it was also unclear about how to accept such cooperation, what would be the 
specific projects, and when Slovakia could initiate such cooperation with China 
(Pleschová, 2016, p. 53-55). Countries had seen the huge potential benefits of the B&R, 
but there were still doubts related to the relatively scarce information that still existed 
on the B&R, such as on specific projects, on its actual implementation, and on the 
material approach. 
In fact, the perception on the B&R Initiative by EU member states is based on the 
official document issued by Chinese government. However, the content of the 
document is a broad narrative lacking the valuable information channel and the specific 
targets or projects. Furthermore, most EU member states kept doubts in regards to the 
actual motivation behind the B&R. As Nadège Rolland argued, the B&R was coming 
forward with a thick political colour, as it was committed to improving China’s 
influence in regional affairs and to ensuring China’s leading position in the world order. 
“The infrastructure diplomacy initiated by Beijing also has a critical strategic 
motivation (…) its grid across the Eurasian continent opens an array of new economic 
and strategic possibilities (…) that could further intensify intra-European divergences 
over Asia policy, cause deep differences between the United States and its European 
allies, and sharpen commercial rivalries” (Rolland, 2015). Milomir Stepić, from the 
institute for political studies of Serbia, and Ivan Zarić, from the Ministry of Defence of 
Serbia, argued that China’s strategy on the B&R may conflict with the geopolitical 
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strategies of powers such as the US, Russia, the EU, and even India (Stepić and Zarić, 
2016, p. 447-464). 
Some scholars believe that the implementation of the B&R in Central and Eastern 
Europe is splitting Europe. “While there are undoubtedly great economic opportunities, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative – and its corollary of growing Sino-European 
monetary ties – also presents the EU with a major political challenge. Here is the risk, 
in fact, that a scramble for Chinese money could further divide EU member states and 
make it more difficult for Brussels to fashion a common position vis-à-vis Beijing. 
Furthermore, China’s economic penetration into Europe may lead to a populist 
backlash and the fate of the port of Piraeus could be the first of such cases” (Casarini, 
2015, p. 9). Moreover, “this could reinforce the idea of a ‘two-track’ Europe-China 
diplomacy in which individual countries and (sub)regions come before the (European) 
Union” (Vangeli, 2015, p. 25). Europe does not have a unified and consistent attitude, 
with some considering the B&R Initiative as an unprecedented opportunity, while 
others see it as a threat and insist that the B&R Initiative will cause internal divisions in 
the EU and undermine the unity of the EU. Critics argue that it lacks transparency and 
does not conform to the norms of the EU. 
To sum up, these arguments are mainly concerned with existing political risks in 
the implementation of the B&R Initiative in Europe. We observed that several 
European countries – especially Central and East European countries – began to 
respond positively to the B&R Initiative. Meanwhile, several other European countries 
had made a negative assessment of China’s B&R Initiative, and had doubts and 
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criticisms on the motivations behind it. 
The third stage refers to the period from June 2015 up to the present. Generally, 
from the EU level and from individual European countries, Europe begun to offer a 
more comprehensive response to the B&R Initiative during this phase. 
In the beginning of 2015, first the UK announced its participation in the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, and became one of its founding member states (HM 
Treasury and Osborne, 2015). The AIIB is a crucial financial component for the B&R 
in terms of Asian infrastructure, and is the property of a governmental multilateral 
financial institution. 
Since then, European countries announced their accession successively. So far, as 
of October 8th 2018, there were 87 member states in the AIIB (AIIB, 2018a), including 
16 EU member states, and 3 non-EU member states in Europe5 (AIIB, 2018b). In 
addition, the China-EU Summit Joint Statement in 2015 stated that “the EU looked 
forward to co-operating with the AIIB in the future” (European Commission, 2015). 
The Joint Statements from the annual EU-China Summits issued from 2015 to 
2018 demonstrated that the EU’s perception on the B&R had changed. For instance, 
“leaders decided to support synergies between these Initiatives (the ‘Investment Plan 
for Europe’ and ‘The B&R Initiative’), and directed the EU-China High-Level 
Economic and Trade Dialogue in September to develop practical avenues for mutually 
beneficial co-operation, including through a possible China-EU co-investment vehicle” 
                                               
5 So far, as of October 8th 2018, the AIIB EU member states are Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, German, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are AIIB 
non-EU member states in the European region. 
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(European Council, 2015), which included for the first time the B&R Initiative in a 
bilateral official statement. This was stated in the 17th EU-China Summit joint 
statement issued on June 29 2015. Then on the July 17 2018, the Joint Statement from 
the 20th EU-China Summit stated that, “the two sides will continue to forge synergies 
between the initiatives of China and the EU, including the EU Investment Plan and 
extended Trans-European Transport Networks, and to promote cooperation in hardware 
and software connectivity through interoperable maritime, land and air transport, 
energy and digital networks. The two sides stressed that this cooperation should 
improve the economic, social, fiscal, financial and environmental sustainability of 
Europe-Asia connectivity. Such cooperation should abide by the shared principles of 
market rules, transparency, open procurement and a level playing field for all investors, 
and comply with established international norms and standards, respective 
international obligations, as well as the law of the countries benefitting from the 
projects, while taking into account their policies and individual situations” (European 
Council, 2018). The issuance of this joint statement confirmed to intention of 
EU-China cooperation by the EU on the B&R Initiative.  
Subsequently, the intentions for cooperation by individual EU member states 
increased, and the cooperation between both sides spread at various levels and fields. 
(Further details in the following item 3.2). In addition, in the last Connecting Europe 
and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy by the European Commission issued on 
September 19 2018, China was mentioned four times, which was more than other 
regional powers, such as Japan, India and Russia. This clearly demonstrates that the EU 
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recognizes the role of China in Asian regional affairs. Furthermore, the document 
highly confirmed the significance of the Eurasian connectivity, and its role in driving 
Eurasian economic growth, which conform to the target of the B&R Initiative in the 
infrastructure field (European Commission, 2018b). 
During this phase, the valuation, perception, and reaction of the European region 
tend to be increasingly positive in terms of response to the B&R Initiative, which 
considers the B&R as mainly a vehicle for promoting economic and trade cooperation 
with countries along the route by fostering the interconnection with involved countries 
(Wang, Picciau, 2018, p. 30). With the development of cooperative projects in the 
European region, the B&R is being considered as a project that attaches importance to 
economic interests. In terms of the cognition of “what is the B&R Initiative”, it gives 
emphasis to the fields of infrastructures, investment, trade, and economic development. 
However, criticisms still remain. For instance Jonathan Holslag argued that China is 
shifting from defensive mercantilism, which aims to protect the homeland market, 
towards offensive mercantilism, as it seeks to gain market shares abroad (Holslag, 2017, 
p. 46). The perception shifted from a geopolitical perspective to that of China’s internal 
demands (Gu, 2015). From the perspective of China’s internal demands, the B&R 
comes mainly as a solution to its domestic overcapacity, it aims to enhance return on 
investment, and contributes towards stable economic development, which is a 
long-term target to revitalize the Chinese economy with consumption as the leading 
factor (Lo, 2015). More importantly, as Fina argued, the new stage of forged synergies 
between China and the EU on the B&R is not only on traditional economic and trade 
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exchanges but also, in building a platform for cooperative development and resource 
integration, while benefiting both China and the EU. Furthermore, it will actively 
explore third-party markets and act as a catalyst to spread the radiation (Fina, 2015). 
Through data analysis and economic calculations, Alicia Garcia Herrero and 
Jianwei Xu, from ‘Bruegel’ (the Brussels-based economic think tank), made an analysis 
to the trade advantages that the B&R will bring to the EU. They argued that the “results 
indicate that the reductions in transportation costs from the Belt and Road Initiative 
should benefit the vast majority of EU countries, especially landlocked countries (…) 
the EU, [being] the biggest winner from the reduction in transportation costs” (Herrero 
and Xu, 2016, p. 2, 9, 11). Besides, various European scholars believe that the B&R 
will contribute to the economic development, and therefore, to benefiting European 
regional prosperity and stability. For instance, Verlare and Putten argued that “the 
European Union faces great challenges when it comes to stabilizing its own 
neighbourhood and it should, therefore, welcome the opportunity to strengthen its 
security role in these regions. Engaging with China’s ‘Belt’ and ‘Road’ Initiative would 
serve the dual purpose of keeping a close eye on China’s growing influence, while 
simultaneously cooperating towards greater regional stability” (Verlare and Putten, 
2015, p. 5, 6). The B&R is thus seen as an opportunity to strengthen the EU-China 
relations, not only in terms of trade and economic exchanges (Hard Connection) but 
also in terms of Soft Connections, by reducing the cultural distance in order to establish 
a strong strategic partnership based on mutual understanding (Picciau, 2016, p. 2).  
The ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ has been receiving increased support and 
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recognition by the European region, as cooperation and interconnection of trade 
between China and the EU under the Belt and Road Initiative is in the interest of 
European countries. The B&R may contribute to the reconfiguration of international 
institutions and towards the emergence of a more multi-polar global order, as some 
scholars have argued. “We are now witnessing the reconfiguration of multilateral and 
international institutions, as well as the emergence of a more multi-polar global order 
that precisely expresses itself and draws from concrete projects like OBOR (One Belt 
One Road)” (Wang, Joël, Xavier, 2017, p. 14). In addition, in the latest observation by 
Grzegorz Stec from the European Institution for Asian Studies, he argues that “indeed, 
the initiative has constantly been in flux since first being introduced (…) due to the 
nature of Chinese foreign policy, we should see the BRI as a process rather than a 
defined strategy or a clear vision. The BRI progresses through an evolutionary process” 
(Stec, 2018). 
During this phase, Europe has attached increasing importance to the B&R 
Initiative, which has gradually caused a positive response within this region. From the 
initial suspicion and criticism up the present position, we believe that there are three 
main reasons for this transition: firstly, the European economy is in urgent need of 
recovery after the debt crisis. With the development of the projects under the B&R 
Initiative - and as European countries have seen that the B&R Initiative is not an empty 
shell - it can bring tangible benefits to this region, which is the most crucial reason. 
Secondly, the Chinese government made a great effort for promoting the synergies 
between the B&R Initiative and the European regional development strategy, as well as 
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in active interactions at the various levels of diplomacy. As mentioned before, Chinese 
leaders have paid frequent visits to Europe in recent years. Chinese President, Premier 
of the State Council, and other senior officers have frequently visited European 
countries, participated in various major conferences in China and Europe, vigorously 
promoted the B&R initiative in various international fora, and committed to the 
implementation of concrete projects. This series of actions effectively increased the 
positive perception on the B&R Initiative within the European region. Thirdly, the 
success of the B&R Initiative in other regions, such as Central Asia, West Asia, and in 
Central and Eastern Europe, has produced benefits that enabled European countries to 
understand the opportunities of the B&R Initiative. 
Many scholars and EU member governments regard that China’s huge 
investments in infrastructure, real estate, and other industries, as well at the Chinese 
tourism consumption in the European region, reflect the transformations that are 
happening in China and in the European economic status, to a certain extent. Which 
many regard as a decline in Europe’s opposition to the rise of China, and that this is part 
of the complex system of China-EU interaction, and not simply the Chinese capital 
flow that is going to Europe (Chen and Julia, 2015, p. 5-12). Indeed, China’s economic, 
financial, and military strength has dramatically increased, while China still faces 
multiple and complex challenges at internal level. Meanwhile, China is attaching 
increasing importance to external affairs and to its influence on the outside world. In 
addition, Chinese General Secretary Xi showed his preference for an approach of 
‘pushing towards the bottom-line without breaking it’, undertaking a substantial 
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transformation of its foreign policy, which caught its partners under-prepared, 
somewhat confused, and with increased chances for miscalculation (Shi, 2015).  
In a nutshell, the process of perception and response to the B&R Initiative in the 
European region is increasingly positive. Meanwhile, the EU also believes that the 
B&R will have an extremely complex impact on China-EU relations. Europe attaches 
great importance to potential cooperation with China, and expects it will contribute to 
European economic recovery, while it also interprets the rise of China as ‘facing the 
challenges of emerging powers’. 
 
3.2. Three Examples of China-EU Cooperation Achievements 
3.2.1. The Synergies between the Investment Plan for Europe and the B&R 
Towards the end of 2014 the EU launched the Investment Plan for Europe 
(Juncker Plan), and the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), expected to 
trigger € 3,440 billion in investments, and China will contribute to the Commission’s € 
315 billion Investment Plan for Europe. The funds shall be mainly invested in strategic 
infrastructures, digital, energy, core industrial projects, interconnected transportation 
infrastructure, education, research and development projects. (European Commission, 
2015; Ministry of Commerce of China, 2014). Among them, the interconnected 
transportation infrastructure is one of the priorities of the Investment Plan for Europe, 
which confirms China’s B&R Initiative, and can be a catalyst for China-EU 
cooperation. 
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The details of such cooperation are stated in the Joint Statement of the China-EU 
2015 Summit: “identify co-operation opportunities between their respective policies 
and sources of funding, including The Belt and Road Initiative and Trans-European 
Networks” (European Parliament, 2015). On September 2015, the Chinese government 
stated at the China-EU Trade and Economic High-level Dialogue that it will invest in 
the Investment Plan for Europe, thus becoming the first non-EU state announcing its 
intention to contribute to the Investment Plan for Europe (European Commission, 
2015). 
On June 2017, the Silk Road Fund and the European Investment Fund signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding aiming at facilitating a co-investment framework for 
Promoting Co-investment, which aims to promote synergies of collaboration between 
the initiatives launched by China and the EU (Silk Fund, 2017).  
Included in the collaboration mentioned above are several transnational railway 
lines of the China Railway Express that have successively be set into operation between 
China and Europe, such as the ‘Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe Railway (2011)6’, the 
‘Yiwu–Madrid railway line (2014)7’ and the ‘Yiwu–London railway line (2017)8’. As 
mentioned before, one of the purposes of the B&R is to integrate existing projects. 
                                               
6 Yu'Xin'Ou Railway is a freight railway route linking the southwestern Chinese city of Chongqing with Duisburg, Germany. It 
crosses the Alataw Pass into Kazakhstan, and crosses Russia, Belarus and Poland before arriving in Duisburg (Brautlecht, 2014). 
7 The Yiwu - Madrid Railway line is a railway route for container trains from the Chinese city of Yiwu to the Spanish city of 
Madrid. The railway crosses Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, Germany and France, ending in the Spanish capital (Shepart, 
2016). 
8 The Yiwu – London Railway Line is a freight railway route from Yiwu, China, to London, United Kingdom. From Yiwu, a 
trading center 300 km south of Shanghai, the railway line crosses 9 countries, namely China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, Poland, 
Germany, Belgium, France, and the UK. In order to get to the UK (Egorava, 2017), the route passes through the Channel Tunnel 
between France and the UK. The London end of the line is located at the DB Eurohub in Barking, East London (BBC, 2017). 
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These railway lines are part of a growing railway network connecting China and 
Europe under the B&R framework, which should benefit the vast majority of EU 
member states, notably by reducing transportation costs. In addition, by the end of 
September 2018, the number of China Railway Express operation cases was more than 
10,000 (Xinhua, 2018), directly accessing 34 cities in 12 countries in Europe (China 
Business Network, 2018). 
Thus, we can observe that common interests are the main element of China-EU 
cooperation. Several consensuses have been reached at top level in terms of 
cooperation design, between China and EU, with remarkable results and clear 
prospects. 
 
3.2.2. “The 16+1 Framework” 
Geographically, the Central and Eastern European region constitutes an important 
pivot for the B&R Initiative. Also, as mentioned before, it was the first region to offer a 
positive response to the B&R Initiative in Europe. Interconnectivity is one of the main 
areas of the ‘16+1 framework’. The cooperation achievements between China and the 
16 European countries are mainly in the following areas: 
The first area is interconnectivity on infrastructures, such as the ‘China-Europe 
Land-Sea Express Route (from the Piraeus Port, in Greece, to Budapest, in Hungary, 
passing through Skopje, in Macedonia, and Belgrade, in Serbia)’ (China Government, 
2014b). The second area is in the field of international industrial capacity, since there is 
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a huge demand for infrastructure construction in Central and Eastern European 
countries, and China has a rich experience in the field of infrastructure construction9. 
The Chinese Government has encouraged homeland enterprises to invest in factories in 
Central and Eastern Europe, to actively participate in the construction of various 
industrial parks, aimed at promoting local employment and upgrading and transforming 
Chinese industries (Xinhua net, 2014), as well as to cooperate in the financial sector. 
China set up a $10 billion special loan, a scale of $3 billion investment fund, and 
launched the second phase of the $1 billion China-Central and Eastern Europe 
Investment Cooperation Fund (Huang and Liu, 2017, p. 30-31; Caixin Media, 2014). 
In addition, as mentioned before, the EU is a normative power in terms of 
standards setting in various areas. The EU has a final say over EU member states on 
many subject matters in Europe, such as procurement procedures, tendering procedures, 
quality of equipment, which means the EU actually has the power to shape the future of 
certain projects under the B&R Initiative (Islam, 2018). 
3.2.3. The Case of the UK 
The UK is one of the founding members of the AIIB. First of all, as the first 
European country to join the AIIB, it fully demonstrates its interest in the B&R 
Initiative. And meanwhile, with the advancement of the B&R, the number of 
cooperation projects between the UK and China are increasing. For instance, on 
                                               
9 China's landscapes vary significantly across its vast width and breadth. China’s railway network, with a route length of over 
100,000 km ranks as the second biggest railway network in the world, and the rapid expansion of China’s high-speed railway 
network in recent years makes it by far the largest in the world (Gupta, 2014), indeed, giant Chinese infrastructure projects are 
reshaping the world (Weller, 2017). 
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October 2015, EDF Energy reached an agreement with China General Nuclear Power 
Corporation (CGN) for a nuclear power plant at Hinkley Point Somerset, worth 24.5 
billion pounds sterling. CGN will pay £6bn for one-third of this plant (BBC, 2015). 
Various regions in the UK are seeking to forge synergies between the B&R 
Initiatives and regional development strategies. Tim Summers, from Chatham House, 
argued that the UK government has emphasized a proposal to boost economic growth 
in the North of England, and its high-end manufacturing industry, to support synergies 
with the B&R Initiative. As there is strong complementarity between these projects, the 
B&R will contribute to the economic recovery and development of the region (Gou, 
2015; UK Government, 2015). 
In the financial field, during Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping’s visit to the 
UK in October 2015, the two sides reached an agreement on issuing RMB (renminbi, 
the Chinese currency) bonds in London. Therefore, London has the first-ever sovereign 
RMB bonds issued outside of China (UK Government, 2016), which has greatly 
promoted the internationalization of RMB since it was included in Special Drawing 
Right (SDR). 
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4. The Existing Risks and Obstacles for China-EU Cooperation in the 
Implementation of the B&R Initiative 
4.1 China’s Own Domestic Issues 
In the case of China’s internal issues, it lacks the capacity to make overall 
arrangements, to make comprehensive plans and to take all factors into consideration.  
One of the factors is whether China’s economy can maintain its pace of growth, 
for China and the EU to successfully cooperate under the B&R. The Chinese economy 
has grown at a fast pace in the past decades, which was lead by three main factors, 
namely consumption, exports and investment. But problems remain at three main levels, 
which are the growth rate of investment is much higher than the growth rate of 
consumption, and thus the gap between consumption and investment has gradually 
increased, which means that consumption cannot digest the huge output of investment. 
In 2008, the financial crisis spread all over the world, thus China’s external 
demand declined, as well as its economic growth, with the problem of overcapacity 
becoming particularly serious. At present, China’s economy is gradually entering a new 
period. Its economic growth rate has changed from high-speed growth to 
medium-high-speed growth, and China is in urgent need of accelerating its economic 
restructuring (Li and Sun, 2016). In this context, in order to maintain internal social 
stability, the Chinese government has to deal with the slowdown in the economy. 
China’s internal issues are mainly caused by the complexity of resource 
co-ordination caused by its imbalanced domestic economic development. The B&R 
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covers 18 provinces, including 10 key cities, namely Xi’an, Lanzhou, Chongqing, 
Xining, Chengdu, Changsha, Wuhan, Hefei, Nanchang and Zhengzhou. As shown in 
Figure 4 below, the overall nature of China’s economic development is that most cities 
in the eastern coast of China are much more developed than those in west interior China. 
The region involved, which was mentioned above, includes both relatively developed 
and relatively backwards regions (Shen, Teng and Song, 2018, p. 12). These regions 
have different economic conditions, development requirements, and strategic 
positioning. How to coordinate and allocate resources under the B&R becomes an 
important issue. 
Fig. 4: China economic development map 
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( Source: https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/9/3314/pdf) 
So far, the internal unfair competition for resources between provinces and cities 
has affected the implementation of the B&R. For instance, it has affected the Sino-Euro 
cargo railway, a major support for the development of the Silk Road Economic Belt. 
Compared with traditional maritime transportation, international railway lines greatly 
shorten the time for cargo to be carried between China and Europe. However, in the 
initial operating period, such transportation of railway cargo is limited due to the 
relatively high cost of railway transportation caused by lack of supply of goods. Under 
the benefits-driven principle, there was domestic competition between local 
governments in China deviating from market law, and thus there was unfair 
competition. The main measure that was undertaken was to implement government 
subsidies, which reached 10% to 40%, and it became a common phenomenon in most 
trains.  
For instance in the ‘Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe Railway’, since 2001, the freight 
subsidy was maintained for two years. In case of the ‘Zhengzhou-Xinjiang-Europe 
Railway’, through local government subsidies, freight rates in the Henan Province were 
reduced to $4,500 per standard container, whereas the cost of freight (including trailer) 
for goods outside the province is $6000 per standard container. For the 
‘Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe Railway’, the local government especially subsidized the 
freight costs for laptop manufacturers, which reduced freight rates by 20% on the basis 
of $9,000 per container. The ‘Wuhan-Xinjiang-Europe Railway’ received local 
government subsidies to keep its freight rates at the same level as those of maritime 
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freight (Jiang and Fan, 2017, p. 28-30).  
These measures made China unable to negotiate with the rest of the world based 
on unified standards, which caused losses in economic benefits, increased burden on 
local governments, and even prevented efficiency and standard setting in the 
implementation of the B&R.  
In Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had a 
constitutional crisis in 2015. “The then main opposition party ‘Social Democratic 
Union of Macedonia’ published 38 batches of recorded conversations which allegedly 
featured high-ranking politicians from the ruling parties discussing direct payments 
from a selected Chinese company” (Agence France-Presse, 2016). More than 50 public 
figures, including top politicians were embroiled in a wire-tapping scandal. “The 
scandal also refocused attention on the role of Chinese infrastructure projects in 
fuelling corruption in the wider Western Balkan region” (Makocki and Nechev, 2017, p. 
1). Furthermore, Chinese investments in the Western Balkans will continue to increase 
in the coming years (Agence France-Presse, 2016; Makocki and Nechev, 2017, p. 1). 
As a result of the bribery and corruption scandal, Chinese enterprises were faced with a 
very adverse public opinion environment in this region, and the context for investment 
in the Western Balkans deteriorated. The Macedonian ruling party of the time is 
responsible for the incident, however, the lack of a legitimate operation mode along 
with staff inability, plus the ignorance of European countries’ laws and regulations 
caused various negative impacts on the implementation of the B&R in Europe.  
Hence, it is imperative to set up a group of professionals specialized in 
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cooperation under the B&R between China and Europe. The participants in the 
implementation of the B&R must have comprehensive knowledge of the language, 
local laws and regulations, industry standards, local conditions, and cooperation 
prospects in European countries. So far, Chinese enterprises still lack professionally 
qualified personnel in its industries. 
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4.2. EU’s Own Domestic Issues 
The implementation of B&R is confronted with the continuous developments of 
European integration, and interaction with the two-tier approach in Europe has become 
a practical feature of cooperation in the European region (Rachman, 2016). According 
to the Lisbon treaty, the EU formulates common policies, and member states participate 
in the process of EU policy-making and as the object of their implementation 
(European Parliament, 2007, p. 36). This is one of the characteristics of China-EU 
cooperation under the B&R - which is different from other regions - and will have a 
profound impact on such cooperation. Therefore, there is a complex policy-making 
system within the EU, as the policies released by the EU impose constraints upon 
member states to a certain extent, and, on the other hand, the measures proposed by 
member states play an important role in EU policy-making. Specifically, such 
complexity is demonstrated by disagreements between the interests of the entire EU as 
a whole vis-a-vis the interests of single member states. There is both disagreement and 
unification on the binding force of the EU’s authority towards its member states, and 
the autonomy of member states. This complex system increases the difficulties for the 
implementation of the China-EU cooperation under the B&R Initiative. 
Firstly, there is divergence of interests between the EU and its member states. For 
instance, in order to benefit economic recovery, the EU tends to attach much 
importance to attracting Chinese investment, while East and Central European 
countries are more concerned about cooperation on infrastructures and capacity with 
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China, then, countries like the UK, France and German also tend to attach importance 
to cooperation with China in third-party markets. These complex interests at stake and 
their concomitant requirements, coupled with the complex EU policy-making system, 
lead to complexities in China-EU cooperation under the B&R. 
For instance, the most typical case is EU’s perception on the “16+1 framework” 
during the initial period. It could be observed that Central and Eastern European 
countries gave positive signals and participated in the B&R Initiative. However, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU considers that the existence of the “16+1 
framework” tends to cause internal divisions within the EU, and will have a negative 
impact on EU’s common trade policy. Actually, the EU has set limits on cooperation 
under this framework. Of the 16 Central and Eastern European countries, 11 are 
member states of the European Union, 5 of which are part of the Eurozone. This policy 
orientation undoubtedly affects the degree of desire of relevant states to cooperate with 
China. 
In a nutshell, under the two-tier approach, how to distinguish and coordinate 
disagreements is a crucial issue for China-EU cooperation on the B&R. 
Secondly, under the two-tier approach, the authority levels of the EU and the 
member states may generate uncertainties from an economic as well as political point 
of view. The relevant EU policies and regulations, and the content of the B&R 
Initiative have demonstrated that the trade policy and the direct investment policies 
involved in the B&R are at the core of the EU, which has to do with EU Economic 
and monetary affairs.  Therefore, cooperation in the economic field is the main 
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content of China-EU cooperation under the B&R Initiative. Furthermore, the EU has 
exclusive decision-making capacity over the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), one of the outcomes of the Lisbon treaty. And although the B&R is mainly 
attached to economic activity, and does not directly involve foreign affairs matters, 
nor security and defence, it will definitely lead to a huge alteration on the geopolitical 
space in Eurasia. As many criticise, the B&R will be accompanied by the 
corresponding geopolitical impact from China.  
There are no doubts that the relevant EU policies will profoundly affect the 
development of the B&R in the European region. In certain fields, such as 
infrastructures, cultural exchanges, etc., the EU does not monopolize the 
policy-making power, and therefore, member states maintain a relatively high degree of 
autonomy in these fields. 
As mentioned before, the integration of the EU is in the making. Namely the level 
of autonomy and range of EU policy-making mechanisms are still developing. In 
general, China’s perception of the complexity between EU and member states national 
laws and regulations remains insufficient, and will be a barrier for China-EU 
cooperation under the B&R Initiative. 
Meanwhile, some European countries and regions are going through an unstable 
political condition, which has also increased the difficulties in implementing the B&R 
in this region. For instance, the case of the port of Piraeus in Greece - part of the 
China-Europe Land-Sea Express Route, as mentioned in chapter 3. The investment of 
Chinese enterprises, plus its additional effects, may contribute to about 10% of the 
 86 
Greek GDP, and help with employment issues in Greece (Liu, 2016). However, as the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis deteriorated, its political status turned to turbulent, and the 
administration changed frequently. In 2015, the incoming Prime Minister Alexis 
Tsipras on the day of inauguration stated that Greece had halted the privatisation plan to 
sell 67% of the shares of Piraeus port, which put China Ocean Shipping Company and 
other four bidders into plight (Koutantou, 2015), although ultimately the China Ocean 
Shipping Company acquired 51% stakes in Piraeus Port (Georgiopoulos, 2016).  
The turbulent political condition raises huge political and economic risks to the 
Chinese investments made in certain European countries. 
Furthermore, the refugee crisis in Europe, terrorism and other security threats 
continuously generate negative impacts on China-EU cooperation under the B&R. For 
instance, the debt crisis, plus the refugee crisis, is leading European extreme-right wing 
parties to acquire more power, and to the emergence of xenophobia in certain countries, 
which manifest as opposition and resistance to foreign investors (Bremmer, 2018). 
 
4.3. The Instability Element between China and the EU 
There are significant differences between China and the EU. 
From the economic point of view, the asymmetry in economic and social 
development creates different priorities, as far as industries to be developed and 
development strategies in China and in the EU. The differences are also present in the 
degree of internal market development and in the ability to attract foreign investment 
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(Zhou, 2018). In economic and trade relations between China and the EU, these 
differences may provide opportunities for cooperation as well as divergence of interests 
(Zhou, 2018).  
From the political perspective, China and the EU pursue different values and are 
based on different political systems. These differences affect the trend of China-EU 
relations in the long run, and also affect cooperation between China and the EU under 
the B&R. For instance, such differences will be reflected in China-EU cooperation 
under the B&R, namely in terms of labour standards, human rights, and environmental 
standards. Both China and the EU see economic development as a pillar for stability, 
but the development bases and approaches of each region are different. China has 
tended to emphasize physical infrastructure and no-strings-attached investment, which 
is based on its own development experience. However, the EU has tended to promote 
institutional reforms, governance, and rule of law, as pre-conditions for inclusive 
economic growth. Both approaches are necessary, but neither one alone is sufficient to 
achieve sustainable development. And while from the theoretical point of view these 
different approaches are complementary, the EU emphasizes normative values such as 
human rights, democracy and civil society in a way that makes it more difficult to 
engage in cooperation (Ghiasy and Zhou, 2017). 
 
4.4. At the Global Level 
On March 22 2018, the US administration decided to rely partly on Section 301 of 
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the Trade Act of 1974 to prevent, what it calls, unfair trade practices and theft of 
intellectual property. Since then, the China-US trade war arose, and, with the response 
from US Allies, the issue scaled up to a global level (Alexandra, 2018). At present, the 
two sides have stalled the trade war that was afflicting both countries and rattling 
financial markets. The White House stated that both parties will “immediately begin 
negotiations”, and has set a three-month negotiation deadline. Failure to negotiate 
would lead to a further escalation of the tariff war (McDonell, 2018; Perkowski, 2019; 
Sanger, Perlroth, Thrush and Rappeport, 2018).  
In this connection Europe is uniquely positioned; on the one hand, due to its 
longstanding strategic alliance with the US, and while, on the other hand, due to its 
growing economic connections with China, economic links between the US and China 
are pervasive, those between Europe and China are deeper. The total of Europe’s 
investment flows to China were more than twice those of the US between 2005 and 
2016, according to United Nations agencies. But America’s latest tariffs on China will 
hurt Europe too, given Europe’s links with the Chinese economy. Also, the EU is not 
involved in a great power rivalry with China (Huang, 2018). 
The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) came into force on January 1st 2015. Its 
members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia (Eurasian 
Economic Union, 2014). As an integrated single market, the EEU aims at promoting 
the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour (Vinokurov, 2017). Virtually, 
the B&R offers opportunities for further cooperation, and the initiative has also 
received wide consideration from political and academic circles in Russia. On May 8 th 
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2015, China and Russia signed the Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the 
Chinese People’s Republic (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2018). And the Joint 
Declaration of the Joint Feasible Studies on Completing Eurasian Economic 
Partnership Agreement with China, released on June 9th 2018 (Ministry of Commerce 
of China, 2018), “agreed to coordinate efforts for the mutual synchronization of the 
processes of contracting the EAEU and the Economic Belt of the Silk Road” (Dragneva, 
2018 p. 19-20). 
In 2009, the EU proposed Eastern Partnership (EaP) involves the former Soviet 
states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (European 
Union external action, 2016). The Eastern Partnership is intended to provide an avenue 
for discussions on trade, economic strategy, travel agreements, and other issues 
between the EU and its Eastern European neighbours. It also aims at building a 
common area of shared democracy, prosperity, stability, and increased cooperation 
(European Union external action, 2016). So far, Russia accused the EU of trying to 
carve out a new sphere of influence, which the EU denied (Lungescu, 2009). Since the 
crisis in Ukraine began on November 21 2013, it has caused serious tensions on 
Russia-EU relations (Higgins and Kramer, 2014). Whether China can balance the 
cooperation with the EU and the Russian lead Eurasian Economic Union, is a great 
question. But promoting the coordinated development of all three sides, requires the 
attention of the three sides. Besides, the Indo-Pacific Spotlight being promoted by 
America, India, Japan and Vietnam, intend to impact China’s influence in the 
Asia-Pacific region (Parameswaran, 2018).  
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All these factors have increased the risks and obstacles of China-EU cooperation 
under the B&R. 
 
4.5. Unstable Regions Along the Route 
The national conditions of the countries along the route are different. In certain 
countries, the authority of the government is weak, which constitutes a serious threat to 
the security of foreign investment. For instance, Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and 
mostly-tribal society (Afghanistan Government, 2004). The government authority 
loses control over the tribal areas. Moreover, certain tribes are self-contained and even 
exist as closed societies, which also regard external forces as threats to their tribes. 
Furthermore, there are contradictions within different tribes, which cause a negative 
impact on China-EU cooperation in countries like Afghanistan. 
There is also terrorism, ethnic separatists, and religious extremists in certain 
countries or regions along the B&R route. The existence of these forces have caused 
social panic, destroyed social stability and unity, and seriously endanger the political 
security and stability of countries and regions, which greatly hinders social economic 
development, and increases the risks for foreign investment (Lu, 2015). Afghanistan 
occupies most of the global drug market, and the scale of drug cultivation is still 
expanding. The drug smuggling network is also expanding rapidly, and currently the 
income from drug smuggling has become an important source of funding for terrorist 
forces, which is conducive to the long-term existence of terrorist groups (McCoy, 2018). 
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The current situation of terrorism poses a direct threat on EU security; it also constitutes 
a negative impact on the interests of China and other countries involved, and the 
potential risks of foreign investment in this region cannot be ignored. 
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Conclusion 
Currently, the global situation is grim and complex, and most states are facing 
development problems. In response to this situation, the Xi Jinping-led Chinese 
government in 2013 officially announced the B&R Initiative. This initiative constitutes 
the legacy and continuation of the ancient Silk Road, and has an important impact on 
the bilateral relations between China and the European Union. 
The B&R Initiative is the way the Chinese government decided to follow to tackle 
its domestic and external challenges in the present situation, while also implementing 
the new stage of Chinese economic reform policy, which mainly involves international 
and domestic balanced development, and regional and sub-regional cooperation. For 
China, the strategic objective of the B&R construction has to do with the fact that 
China’s export-oriented economy made remarkable achievements since the Chinese 
economic reform policy, however, there are still some issues such as its imperfect 
financial market, unevenly distributed economic space, and uncoordinated regional 
development. Promoting the implementation of the B&R can safeguard the security of 
China’s Western region and optimize its peripheral diplomacy; it will help deal with 
transnational criminal activities, safeguard sub-regional security, and therefore promote 
regional peaceful development. The Chinese economic reform policy has entered a new 
stage. The B&R has been supported and participated by most of the countries along the 
route. This may play a role in enhancing China’s political, economic and cultural 
influence, thereby improving China’s national security. 
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China’s economic development experience, based namely on advanced industrial 
technology and on the equipment manufacturing industry, especially in high-speed 
railways, nuclear power, and Beidou satellite navigation industries - which are in a 
leading position in the world -, will play a significant role in realizing the 
“interconnection” between the countries along the route. In addition, China’s foreign 
exchange reserves and its high degree of policy coherence comply with the demands of 
the long-term implementation of the B&R. In terms of financial support, certain 
financial cooperation models were established, such as the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. 
The B&R covers the Eurasian continent, involving many different regional 
patterns such as Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, South Asia, 
the Middle East, and the European Union. “The Silk Road Economic Belt” and “the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road” will connect the different Eurasian regions. Consequently, 
the implementation of the B&R will change China’s geopolitical context. The 
implementation of the B&R involves elements of regional geopolitics, security, and 
economy, based on five principles, namely policy coordination, facilities connectivity, 
free trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds – it will thus strengthen 
China’s geopolitical ties with countries along the route. 
With the passing of time, the EU’s response to the B&R has changed significantly. 
European countries initially raised doubts and even criticisms on the B&R when it was 
put forward in 2013 and early 2014. From March 2014 to June 2015, several Central 
and Eastern European countries represented by the ‘16+1 cooperation framework’ 
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begun to respond more positively to the B&R Initiative. Then, in recent years, an 
increasing number of member states have become involved in the B&R. The perception 
on the B&R by EU member states’ public opinion is gradually becoming positive, 
compared with the initial period, which demonstrates that the aspiration for cooperation 
by member states is increasing. 
As regards the theoretical framework employed in this dissertation, which is 
Constructivism, its main premise is that the interaction among actors in the 
international scene will reshape their identity, perceptions, and interests. Such 
interaction will influence the relations between states, such as is the case with China 
and the EU member states within the context of the B&R framework. 
The B&R Initiative has the potential to drive common security by forging 
economic development, since EU member states have joined all kinds of components 
of the B&R, such as the AIIB, and the ‘16+1 framework’. The projects under the B&R 
mainly operate on the field of infrastructure, which will contribute towards enhanced 
trade between all states along the route. Its five principles are policy coordination, 
facilities connectivity, free trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. 
The interaction between participant states has been promoted in many respects. EU 
member states have demonstrated that there are certain shared interests between China 
and the EU. Furthermore, China and the EU also feel threatened by certain global issues. 
However, due to the value discrepancies between both sides, there are still obstacles in 
China-EU cooperation as regards the B&R. From the perspective of Social 
Constructivism, national security issues can be solved by developing a common 
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community and common interests. The social structure could define common 
perceptions, expectations, and consensus. Constructivism believes there is space for 
cooperation between states, especially by emphasizing the inter-subjective 
understanding between states. In other words, depending how each international actor 
evaluates the other, there could be cooperation or competition between them. 
The assumption that governments behave as rational egoists, specifically China 
and the EU, is not supported by this dissertation due to the various multi-level, diverse 
cooperation projects under the B&R framework. At EU level, both sides have decided 
to support synergies between the Investment Plan for Europe and The B&R Initiative. 
At sub-regional level, the ‘16+1 framework’ between China and Central and Eastern 
European Countries is operating. At the level of individual member states, in order to 
revitalize their economies, the UK, France, Germany, and other member states are 
seeking to forge synergies between the B&R and their own domestic economic 
development plans. Therefore, the level of progress in implementing the B&R within 
the EU is remarkable, and the growing aspirations of EU member states to join in 
demonstrates that China-EU cooperation under the B&R framework is in line with the 
interests of both sides. 
The B&R Initiative has catalysed a new development of China-EU relations. 
However, under the framework of this initiative, China-EU cooperation is also facing 
several risks. 
The underlying objective of the present dissertation consisted in assessing what 
promotion can be made in order to achieve mutually beneficial results for China-EU 
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cooperation under the B&R. 
EU member states have actively joined the AIIB, in order to forge synergies 
between the initiative and the EU strategy, however, several countries along the B&R 
route are in a political situation of unrest, and thus there are geopolitical risks and 
investment risks on China-EU cooperation which need to be a addressed by both sides. 
China needs to further clarify the role of the EU in the B&R, as well as to enhance 
the transparency of the B&R Initiative before the local governments and the public, 
which will effectively enhance mutual trust between both sides. China needs to keep 
improving its level of economic reforms, optimize the environment for foreign 
investment, regulate unfair competition, improve the related implementation 
mechanism, laws, and regulations, in order to provide a reliable institutional framework 
for investment by European corporations in China. Moreover, on the basis of the 
concept of equal cooperation and mutual benefit, both sides should intensify their 
cooperation in the fields of infrastructures and finances, and take advantage of the 
initiative to explore broader areas of cooperation and to enhance bilateral cooperation. 
Also, China needs to attach greater importance to cooperation with important 
stakeholders such as Russia and the US, as well as with other overseas markets. It is 
important to fully consider the interests of all stakeholders. For instance, for the EU, 
enhanced cooperation with Central Asian countries is conducive to the goal of EU’s 
energy development, that is, to achieve diversification of energy supply, thereby 
reducing its energy dependence on Russia.  
Indeed, due to differences in languages and culture, there is a lack of relevant 
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expert professionals to support both sides, i.e., negotiators who can develop 
interactions in an efficient way, which requires skills such as being familiar with the 
laws and regulations of both sides and speaking several languages, etc. Furthermore, 
since there is a lack of mutual trust between China and the EU, plus the complexity of 
China’s internal resource allocation and overall planning, the lack of transparency in 
China’s implementation, the lack the relevant institutions and legislation, the 
differences between China and Europe in terms of values and ideology, and the 
differences in the level of economic development of EU member states - and thus EU 
member states have diverse demands for national economic development - it is difficult 
to form a common response to the B&R from the European side. Additionally, the 
implementation of the B&R is also threatened by the political instability in several 
countries along the routes, by regional non-traditional security, and by the interference 
of the US. All these factors will affect cooperation between China and the EU under the 
context of the B&R Initiative.  
To overcome these various difficulties, more dialogue among the various actors on 
different aspects of cooperation is required, including participation of civil society and 
other non-state actors, without however confining the issue to a purely academic 
discussion or it becoming the target of exaggerations from Media. 
In a nutshell, there is still much work to be done on China-EU cooperation under 
the B&R Initiative, which means that this dissertation provides an avenue for further 
academic inquiry, as the present operation remains understudied, whether at EU level 
or at member states level, despite the current surge in academic research on subjects 
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related to the B&R. 
The present work has addressed the positions of China and the EU as two regions 
with somewhat significant differences in ideology that can however share some areas 
of their strategies under economic cooperation. Nevertheless, it seems that the ultimate 
solution for issues such as global security, regional conflicts, poverty, and a series of 
other global issues, is global governance. The common challenges require unity and 
cooperation in order to improve the present status. 
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